Relations between Iran and the United States are speeding up a fundamental shift in the Gulf’s security order. For years, GCC states looked almost exclusively to Washington for security. In recent years, however, questions about the sustainability, expense, and political price of that dependence have led many in the region to look elsewhere. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, sizable professional army, geography, and close ties to both Iran and the Arab states are making it a natural fit for an emerging role in this new security order.
An example of this phenomenon can be seen in Pakistan’s foreign relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Pakistan and Kuwait signed a defense cooperation agreement last year in 2023. Recently, Kuwait has discussed upgrading that deal with Pakistan. Despite recent media reports to the contrary, there is not currently a new signed mutual-defense agreement between the two states. However, the fact that negotiations have been happening at all signals Kuwait’seeking to deepen its military ties with Pakistan as uncertainties in the region grow. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs verified the initial agreement. Reuters adds that talks regarding an expanded pact are “still in preliminary stages.”
It does not mean that the Gulf states will cut their ties with America anytime soon. The presence of U.S. bases, weapons systems, intelligence operations, and naval power will remain a feature of regional security for the foreseeable future. What we are seeing is the emergence of a new balance of relationships in which Gulf states build parallel connections with Pakistan, Turkey, China, and others.
Pakistan is valuable because it shares deep bonds with Saudi Arabia and other GCC members but, unlike them, has continued to engage Iran economically and diplomatically. It can therefore play a role that Washington, Tehran and Tel Aviv cannot: serve as a balancer between competing security blocs.
The diplomatic worth of that gesture became evident in the June memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States. Pakistan, together with Qatar and other regional intermediaries, facilitated a deal aimed at stopping aggression, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and discussing sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program. However, that memorandum was never meant to be a permanent peace agreement. Loosely worded to allow for more discussion, issues like maritime governance, sanction relief, uranium enrichment, proxy militias, and security assurances were left to be determined later. When talks broke down and military strikes resumed, the agreement’s weaknesses were highlighted, though Pakistan and Qatar continue to provide mediation. Mediators Qatar and Pakistan have remained focused on returning to de-escalation, according to the Associated Press.
Situated at the heart of the crisis is the Strait of Hormuz. Vital to the global economy’s energy needs and to the fiscal solvency of many Gulf nations, Washington demands free passage while Tehran views sway over the strait as a necessary strategic hedge. The issue is a matter of survival for Iran but an elective – and increasingly costly – military commitment for America. Tehran has fewer conventional assets with which to fight, but its missiles, drones, geography and proxy allies allow it to leverage significant power.
The emerging Gulf order is unlikely to be purely American or wholly “Islamic.” It is more likely to be multipolar: based on overlapping partnerships between the GCC states, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, China, Russia and the United States. Pakistan’s challenge will be to maximize cooperation and avoid becoming a tool of confrontation with Iran.
Its true worth might instead lie not in wielding force but in promoting indivisible security: you cannot make yourself safe by leaving your neighbors unsafe. In this war-weary region, Pakistan has the opportunity to become not only a security partner but a legitimate deal broker.
