Rear Admiral (Rtd) A S M Abdul Baten
The Ganges is both a lifeline and a source of vulnerability for Bangladesh. As the downstream riparian of a basin shared principally with India, Bangladesh experiences the consequences of upstream regulation in two contrasting forms: shortage during the dry season and destructive excess during the monsoon. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty provided an important framework for bilateral cooperation, but its fixed arrangements and limited formal provisions are increasingly inadequate in the context of climate change, changing river morphology, increasing water demand and escalating upstream infrastructure. The treaty is due to expire in December 2026, making an important opportunity to negotiate a more comprehensive and climate-responsive framework. This paper argues that the next agreement should move beyond the allocation of water at a single point and establish a basin-wide regime based on equitable utilization, transparency, environmental sustainability, prior notification and shared flood management. It also examines the relevance of South Korea’s Peace Dam experience as a cautionary and constructive analogy, and considers whether neutral technical or regional third-party engagement could support a durable solution.
A Personal Preamble: a Lesson from the Han River
Almost 28 years ago I was attending a mid-level military staff course in Istanbul Naval Staff College. As part of the course curriculum, I had to present my country to the college, where at one stage I did talk about water-sharing issues with our neighbor. Immediately after presentation, one of my friends attending the same course, Lt Commander Kim from Republic of Korea, told me privately about a similar situation in his country. He described the challenges South Korea faced in managing the North Han River. He particularly mentioned the challenges created after North Korea constructed the Imnam, or Kumgangsan, Dam.
According to his account, South Korea, as the downstream riparian, feared two apparently contradictory dangers. In dry periods, upstream retention could reduce downstream availability. During periods of heavy rainfall, sudden or insufficiently communicated releases could aggravate flooding downstream. He also recounted how South Korea responded by constructing the Peace Dam, supported in part by a remarkable public fundraising campaign. The project became a symbol of national concern and unity over the security implications of unilateral control over a shared river.
The broader historical dispute between the two Koreas is documented, including concerns relating to the Imnam Dam, the Peace Dam and later efforts at inter-Korean cooperation. However, the personal recollection that the Peace Dam was deliberately used to flood North Korean territory, thereby directly compelling an agreement, should not be presented as established historical fact without further evidence. The more reliable lesson is different: a transboundary river cannot be managed safely through unilateral decisions, secrecy or the assumption that one riparian can permanently externalize the costs of its actions onto the other. That lesson is highly relevant to Bangladesh and India as the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty approaches its expiry in December 2026.
The Asymmetry of the Ganges System
Bangladesh and India officially share 54 transboundary rivers. The Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna systems are by far the most important because they carry the vast majority of the region’s river flow and shape Bangladesh’s agriculture, fisheries, navigation, flood regime, sediment deposition, delta ecology and overall life of people. The river enters Bangladesh after flowing through India, where substantial infrastructure and withdrawals influence downstream conditions. The Farakka Barrage, located in West Bengal, was constructed to divert water towards the Hooghly system. Its operation has long been a central concern in Bangladesh, particularly because dry-season flows are essential for agriculture, fisheries, navigation, salinity control and the ecological health of the southwest.
The problem is not simply that Bangladesh receives “too little” water. It is that the timing, variability and quality of streams matter as much as aggregate volume. During the dry season, reduced freshwater flows can intensify salinity intrusion, degrade wetlands, impair navigation and threaten agricultural productivity. The consequences are distributed across communities that have limited capacity to adapt. The environmental effects may also extend beyond immediate human use, affecting complete Riverine biodiversity.
At the other extreme, Bangladesh is exposed to severe monsoon flooding. Flooding is a natural feature of the delta and cannot be attributed solely to upstream releases. Rainfall within Bangladesh, basin-wide precipitation, river morphology, drainage congestion, embankments and tidal conditions all contribute. Nevertheless, upstream storage, barrage operations and the timing of releases can influence flood peaks and the capacity of downstream authorities to prepare. The issue, therefore, is not to make an unqualified allegation against India, but to insist that upstream operational decisions affecting downstream populations must be communicated transparently and governed through agreed procedures. Bangladesh’s vulnerability is intensified by geography. As a densely populated lower riparian situated in a delta, it bears risks generated across a much larger basin. This lopsidedness gives the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization with particular practical importance.
Why the 1996 Framework Requires Renewal
The 1996 Treaty was a significant diplomatic achievement. It established a formula for sharing Ganges flows at Farakka during the dry season and created a Joint Committee to monitor implementation. Its continuation for three decades demonstrates the value of negotiated arrangements. Yet the treaty was designed in a hydrological and political context that has changed substantially.
First, climate change is altering the reliability of historical flow patterns. Rainfall is becoming more variable, extreme events are intensifying, and prolonged dry periods may occur alongside severe floods. Recent disaster of flooding in Nepal has also significance on probable consequences in future. A formula based primarily on historical averages may not adequately protect either riparian under increasingly uncertain conditions.
Second, the treaty’s focus on dry-season allocation does not fully address the wider river system. A modern agreement must include monsoon flood management, environmental flows, sediment, salinity, navigation, groundwater interactions and ecosystem protection. Water sharing should not be reduced to the division of measured discharge at one station only.
Third, trust depends on credible information. Where data on rainfall, reservoir levels, barrage operations and expected releases are incomplete, delayed or inaccessible, technical disagreements quickly become political disputes. Bangladesh has a legitimate interest in receiving timely prior warning with information that allow authorities to protect lives, properties and evacuate vulnerable populations.
From Water Allocation to Water Security
The central conceptual shift should be from “sharing water” to “sharing water security.” This approach recognizes that India’s legitimate needs and Bangladesh’s downstream rights are not necessarily unharmonious. Cooperation can create benefits through improved storage, coordinated release schedules, flood forecasting, watershed restoration, sediment management and optimum agricultural use.
A Renewed Treaty Should Contain Minimum Four Mutually Reinforcing Elements.
The first is a dynamic allocation mechanism. Instead of relying exclusively on fixed historical figures, the parties should establish rules that respond to verified hydrological conditions. Such rules could include minimum ecological and humanitarian thresholds etc.
The second is a binding information-sharing regime. Data should cover river discharge, rainfall, reservoir storage, planned operational changes and flood forecasts. Notification of major releases should occur sufficiently in advance and through reliable, continuously functioning channels at both state and divisional levels.
The third is integrated flood management. Downstream flooding should not be treated solely as Bangladesh’s domestic problem. India and Bangladesh should develop joint flood forecasting, coordinated reservoir operations, emergency communication and, where appropriate, shared investment in protective infrastructure. Such cooperation would not eliminate floods, but it could reduce losses.
The fourth is institutional accountability. A strengthened joint commission consisting of experts should possess regular meeting schedules, transparent reporting obligations and procedures for resolving technical disputes. Independent scientific review could help determine whether disagreements arise from measurement, interpretation or policy.
The Peace Dam analogy and third-party engagement
The South Korean Peace Dam experience offers a useful analogy, but not a blueprint. Bangladesh should not interpret it as an argument for retaliatory infrastructure or an adversarial arms race in water. Rather, the analogy highlights the political importance of national resilience and the risks created when a downstream country lacks confidence in upstream conduct.
For Bangladesh, a “Peace Dam” mindset could mean investment in flood-resilient infrastructure, improved early-warning systems, basin research, dry-season water conservation and public awareness. More importantly, it could represent a diplomatic demand for cooperation rather than unilateral control. Although India and Bangladesh have traditionally preferred bilateral negotiations, limited third-party engagement may be useful, if carefully designed. A neutral technical institution, an international river-governance body or a regional platform could assist with data verification, hydrological modelling and mediation. Third-party involvement need not undermine sovereignty or convert the dispute into international litigation. Its purpose would be to reduce suspicion and provide jointly accepted scientific evidence.
A more recent good initiative has already been taken by the present government (TDS, 13 May 2026) to raise barrage to safeguard the interests of the people of the country. The government has approved the Tk 34,497.25 crore Padma Barrage (1st Phase) project, to be implemented by the Bangladesh Water Development Board from July 2026 to June 2033 with full government financing. Covering 19 districts, the project aims to restore the flow and navigability of major rivers, reduce salinity and waterlogging, improve irrigation and drainage, and strengthen groundwater recharge and freshwater availability. It is also expected to protect the Sundarbans ecosystem, enhance biodiversity, and support agriculture, fisheries and forestry across a large part of Bangladesh. Overall, the project is intended to address the long-term consequences of reduced dry-season Padma flows following the Farakka Barrage and promote sustainable water-resource management and regional economic development. This initiative should be successful for the survival of the people in the northern as well as southern part of Bangladesh.
Regional cooperation could also connect the Ganges issue with broader Himalayan and South Asian water governance. Organizations such as SAARC have historically faced political limitations, but a specialized technical mechanism involving basin states, universities and international experts could still contribute to knowledge-sharing and disaster preparedness.
Recommendations
As negotiations approach December 2026, Bangladesh should pursue the following objectives:
- Negotiate a climate-responsive treaty based on verified real-time and seasonal hydrological data rather than relying only on historic averages.
- Secure a meaningful minimum-flow and guarantee clause that protects human needs, ecosystems, agriculture and salinity control during severe dry periods.
- Expand the treaty’s scope to include monsoon floods, environmental flows, sediment, navigation, fisheries and water quality.
- Establish mandatory prior notification of significant changes in barrage, reservoir or dam operations that may affect downstream flows.
- Create a permanent joint technical commission with experts along with authority to monitor data, publish reports and address implementation disputes.
- Develop an open data platform through which agreed river-flow, rainfall and operational information can be accessed by researchers and affected communities.
- Introduce drought- and flood-sharing protocols so that exceptional hydrological conditions do not leave one country carrying disproportionate costs.
- Invite neutral scientific observers or technical facilitators where both parties agree, particularly for data verification and dispute resolution.
- Strengthen Bangladesh’s domestic resilience through river restoration, wetland protection, flood forecasting, salinity management and efficient water use.
- Adopt a basin-wide diplomatic strategy that treats India’s legitimate requirements and Bangladesh’s downstream security as interdependent rather than mutually exclusive.
Conclusion
The expiry of the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty should be understood immediately not merely as a deadline, but as a historic opportunity. Bangladesh’s concerns are grounded in geography, ecology and the lived experience of communities exposed to both dry-season deprivation and monsoon devastation. At the same time, durable progress requires careful distinction between verified evidence and political assertion. The most sustainable outcome is a treaty that recognizes the Ganges as a connected system. India cannot secure its water interests by disregarding downstream consequences, and Bangladesh cannot protect its people through protest alone. The future lies in transparent data, equitable rules, shared flood management and institutions capable of adapting to climate uncertainty. The voice raised in favour of Bangladesh is therefore not a demand for privilege; it is a demand for fairness, accountability and shared security in a common river basin.
Author:
Rear Admiral (Rtd) A S M Abdul Baten
Rear Admiral (Rtd) A S M Abdul Baten, Secretary General Bangladesh Ocean Going Ship Owners’ Association
Source: https://southasiajournal.net/post/bangladesh/61681/from-water-sharing-to-shared-water-security-reframing-bangladeshindia-ganges-cooperation-before-december-2026
