INDIAN MILITARY CAPABILITIES FOR INTERVENTION IN BANGLADESH – 1975

Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M01066A000800Jecret3 Indian Military Capabilities for Intervention in Bangladesh Secret DCI/NIO 2494/75 26 November 1975 DIA review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M01066A000800180004-3  25X1 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80MO1066A000800180004-3 Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80MO1066A000800180004-3  Approved For Tease 200f2 I-RDP80M0106 J00800180004-3 November 26, 1975 SUBJECT: Indian Military Capabilities for Intervention in Bangladesh (NOTE: This memorandum is a capabilities study. It does not estimate the likelihood of Indian in- tervention or discuss the political considerations surrounding such intervention.) The Key Points — Within three days of a decision to do so, India could commence full scale military operations against Bangladesh. – India could readily commit ground forces of over 150,000 men — without significantly weakening its defenses against China and Pakistan — against Bangladesh ground forces of no more than 87,000 men who are already at least partially demoralized. – Indian air and naval superiority would be even greater. – New Delhi would probably use overwhelming force — including airborne and helicopter assaults — in the hope that a quick takeover would minimize international reactions. India would establish full control over the government of Bangladesh and a l urban and administrative centers within a maximum of two weeks — probably much sooner. Some guerrilla activity against the Indians might continue for a time. ?- The December through April period normally provides the most favorable weather for offensive operations in Bangladesh. * This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for South and Southeast Asia. It was drafted by the Defense Intelligence Agency and coordinated with the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Re- search of the Department of State. Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M01066A000800180004-3 SECRET  Approved For Tease 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M01066WO0800180004-3 SECRET The Details 1. The paragraphs below examine how the Indian armed forces would carry out a military intervention in Bangladesh, and what the military results of such intervention would be. They do not estimate the likelihood of Indian intervention or discuss the political considerations surrounding such an intervention. This memorandum also does not examine actions short of conventional military operations which India might undertake to bring about a change of government in Dacca -?- such as covert instigation of another coup or support of dissident groups within Bangladesh. The Forces That India Would Use Ground Forces 2. Indian ground forces at present total more than 1,000,000 men. over 150,000 of these could be committed to action against Bangladesh without significantly weakening India’s defenses against China or Pakistan.* The units to be employed would al- most certainly come partly from India’s Eastern Command (head- quartered in Calcutta), and partly from India’s general reserve. 25X1 Although the Indians might not use so large an intervention force, the following Table shows the units from which the forces would probably be taken, their strengths, 5X1 Unit From the Eastern Command 57th Mountain Division 71st Indep. Mtn. Brigade 8th Mountain Division 20th Mountain Division Paramilitary Forces: Border Security Forces (BS Special Frontier Forces (S From general reserve forces 50th Parachute Brigade 9th Infantry Division 4th Mountain Division 36th Infantry Division TOTAL about 87,000 men. In the 1971 war, India committed 112,500 ground troops against a force of some 72,000 in East Pakistan. As paragraphs 11 and 12 below will show, the present ground forces of Bangladesh are – 2 – SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80MO1066A000800180004-3  Approved For B4ease 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M0106q&00800180004-3 SECRET’ 3. Mars 1 and 1A show the present location of the units listed above (except for the paramilitary forces, which are scattered along the Bangladesh border), as well as the location of the many other Indian ground force divisions that are not likely to be used in a military action against Bangladesh. 4. Several points should be made with regard to the units shown on these maps. First, one of the Indian divisions closest to Bangladesh, the 23rd Mountain Division headquartered at Rangia, probably would not participate in action against Bangla- desh because most of its subordinate units are deployed along the Sino-Tibetan border, and would remain there out of Indian concern over possible Chinese reactions. Second, in central India the 54th Infantry and 6th Mountain Divisions would also probably remain in reserve to counter any Pakistani or Chinese reaction. The 31st Armored Division, also in central India, could easily be added to an intervention force in Bangladesh, but the terrain there is not particularly favorable for armor. 5. Indian paramilitary forces would also play a signifi- cant role in any military intervention. An estimated 12 to 15 battalions (15,000 men) of the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) are now deployed along the border with Bangladesh, prob- ably supported by two or three BSF Post Artillery Groups. (We do not know the precise make-up of a BSF Artillery Group, but it probably has ten to eighteen 25-pounder field guns.) All of these BSF units are similar to regular army units and can be readily integrated into the regular army. Army commanders can and do employ them as standard infantry and artillery. India also has a highly mobile Special Frontier Force (SFF), an un- conventional warfare unit of about 5,000 men who could be em- ployed in long range patrolling and could conduct sabotage, disrupt communications and foment unrest in the interior of Bangladesh. SFF units were used in this manner during the 1971 war. Air Force 6. India would have total air superiority over Bangladesh, facing virtually no opposition from the Bangladesh Air Force. The Indian Air Force (IAF) would be able to dedicate most of its aircraft to logistical and tactical operations in support of attacking ground forces. 7. The IAF Eastern Air Command would be able to support an intervention more than adequately with the air assets nor- mally assigned to bases in its area (see Map 2). These forces – 3 .- SECRET Approved For Release 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80MO1066A000800180004-3  Approved For RIase 2007/02/07 : CIA-RDP80M0106GAR00800180004-3 Indian Ground Order of Battle Sr Line nirSP Par Lucknow r4de”Central Command F6lttl, ~ All h b d a 9 5rpss Armored Brigade Armored Division Infantry Brigade Infantry Division Mountain Brigade Mountain Division aa 31^.Jhansi Z/ ~~Saugor ( * /36th Ambala atiala? [inda’j -41 16th NEW DELHI, General HQD Mathura’ 12th Jaipur Agr Jodhpur’ 4th Arabian Sea .Poona G Southern Command art k