The QUAD – a U.S. led alliance was originally created in 2004 in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami, and later upgraded into an informal arrangement to reshape strategic geopolitics in an outstretched region extending from the Gulf of Aden to Cape Horn.
Analysing the situation from his country’s perspective, Ambassador Jiming observed that bilateral relations might take a hit by any move on Bangladesh’s part to align with this grouping of four Indo-Pacific nations seeking to counter Beijing’s desire to be a catalyst for regional and global economic upliftment.
Perhaps the Chinese diplomat’s apprehension stemmed from an overt global attempt to undermine his country’s legitimate right to lift millions out of impoverishment in the extended neighbourhood. After all, the U.S. has consistently maintained that tactical containment of perceived Chinese aggression is QUAD’s primary objective.
That an innocuous observation made to diplomatic correspondents during a routine entente was blown out of proportion to provoke a bitter misunderstanding, does point to a methodical design of whipping up anti-China sentiment in Bangladesh in a calibrated manner.
In fact, Bangladesh joining QUAD is very much a hypothetical question in the absence of any formal invite.
Moreover, Dhaka has assiduously pursued a policy of non-alignment while maintaining close ties with key economic powerhouses like China and India simultaneously.
To be fair to China’s diplomatic representative in Dhaka, he never challenged his host nation’s right to determine the course of its foreign policy in the best interest of its people.
Rather, Sino-Bangladesh relations have been extremely robust, with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Beijing in 2019 providing a noteworthy boost, and the Chinese leadership extending a generous helping hand to sustain Bangladesh’s magical economic progress.
QUAD, according to some pundits, is supposed to fill the post-cold war geo-strategic gaps that have emerged in contemporary times, which cannot be addressed by any single country. But QUAD’s overemphasis on security, induced by an extreme China-paranoia, makes it a self-centred bloc of nations opposed to Beijing ideologically.
The message coming out from the first QUAD summit, held virtually, last March was unambiguous – that of the Southeast Asian nations being genuinely worried about the realistic possibility of their region plunging into turmoil, as confrontation overrides pragmatic cooperation on more practical and immediate concerns.
Alarmingly, there is loose talk about war with China within the QUAD family, with Australian defence minister Peter Dutton going to the extent of predicting an armed conflict involving China over the Taiwan Strait in the immediate future. Also, U.S. President Joe Biden’s top Asia advisor Kurt Campbell prognosticates a fierce Sino-U.S. competition being the dominant paradigm, as the era of engagement fades into oblivion. However, QUAD’s commitment to strive for a region that is free, open, inclusive, healthy, unconstrained by coercion and anchored by democratic values will inevitably set off alarm bells in some regional capitals.
China being ASEAN’s largest trading partner, QUAD’s very concept, nuanced by bellicose jingoism, will not go down well even in nations paying lip service to the idea of pushing Beijing to the wall today.
The fact is, ocean beds in Southeast Asia and beyond are literally treasure troves, consisting of unimaginable wealth of mineral resources and the next major global confrontation will revolve around the tussle over its ownership.
As the evolving scenario gets complicated due to the escalating strategic contest between Beijing and Washington, more and more nations will be compelled to do a balancing act, instead of being fixated on the limited choices.
Adding to the woe, there will be intra-QUAD power scrambles like the one involving U.S. Naval ships breaching Indian sovereignty over her exclusive economic zone without prior consent.
Great power politics never leave a strategic vacuum, and hence QUAD will face stiff challenges. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s most trusted foreign policy aide Yang Jiechi flew into Russia to discuss security and strategic cooperation.
This writer recalls a communication with a former Russian spy chief, who did not rule out synchronization of the Eurasian Economic Union and Belt and Road Initiative on the basis of a quid pro quo, to develop Russia’s Far East, and further alluded to such cooperation providing a strong foundation for Sino-Russian tactical collaboration in areas of mutual strategic interests.
Beijing also entered into a 25-year strategic pact with Iran last year. Clearly, Sino-Russian synergy, coupled with greater cooperation with Iran and Pakistan will pave the way for a larger axis, pivotal to checkmating QUAD’s expansionist approach, which is being resented in some smaller nations across the Indo-Pacific.
The Indian Ocean littoral state of Maldives, having entered into America’s strategic security ambit through a defence cooperation agreement in 2020 and hosting Indian security infrastructure, is already seething in anger against foreign military presence.
Unfortunately, the Americans are repeating the same mistake they committed immediately after the end of the Cold War, of expanding NATO into Russia’s face, thinking that defeat of Communism resulted in the death of ideology in international politics.
Since diplomacy is all about pulling off unexpected victory from hopeless situations, effective crisis communication can make the outstretched Indo-Pacific Sea lanes a zone of peace, harmony and stability.
Seema Sengupta is a Calcutta based journalist and columnist
Email: sengupta.seema@gmail.com
