Pakistan’s last ditch diplomatic effort at the UN to avert defeat fails as “Tiger” Niazi surrenders at Dhaka
As another day concluded with Indian Air Force MIG-21s and Hunter jets screaming across Dhaka sky, firing off missiles and strafing targets below with the strange sound of a heavy steel chest being dragged upon a coarse concrete floor, General AAK Niazi rode towards the governor’s house in downtown Dhaka.
All he could do was look up at the sky and see the glowing tracer rounds from his Ack Ack battery drawing lazy arcs across the dark sky in a city engulfed in air raid precaution darkness. He could hear anti-aircraft guns around the air field going off furiously. Acrid smell hung in the cold December air. There were no Pakistani F-86 Sabres to chase the Indian attackers. By December 6, only three days into the Indian air attack on Dhaka, his entire 14th squadron of Sabres, the first transonic jets to be built, were wiped off. The Tejgaon airport runway was pocked with large bomb craters. Only helicopters could operate from there.
Governor AM Malik had wanted to see him to get a brief on the war situation. Only the day before, Malik, a Bangali slavishly loyal to the Punjabis, wanted his cabinet to tour the countryside and mobilise public support for Pakistan.
That day, on December 7, Niazi accompanied by Gen Rao Farman Ali, who had led the genocide in Dhaka, and another senior officer sat with Malik. Niazi was “in a terrible shape, haggard, obviously had no sleep,” is how Farman Ali described the commander on that day in his deposition to the Hamoodur Rahman Commission formed by Pakistan to investigate its defeat.
There was more silence than real talks as Indian field guns boomed in the near distance. It was obvious that Niazi’s war strategy of “stretched out fingers rolling back into an iron fist” to hammer the enemy was falling apart.
Niazi, the Tiger Niazi as he was known, the gallantry award winner in the Second World War and 1965 Indo-Pak war, then broke down in tears.
With three million Bangalis dead behind him and the country left in devastation, the Butcher of Baluchistan hid his face in his hands and “started sobbing like a child.” The Governor got his answer on the war situation. A week later he ran like a rat to take shelter at the Intercontinental Hotel that had been declared a neutral zone by the Red Cross with the imminent fall of Dhaka.
But for now, he said he would write to president Yahya Khan to arrange a ceasefire, which he did the next day.
By this time the situation had further deteriorated. The Indian forces and Mukti Bahini had pushed further beyond Niazi’s “line of no penetration.” The joint forces were basically bypassing the Pakistani positions that created Niazi’s “stretched fingers” and cut their retreat to deny that “iron feast.”
With East Pakistan slipping out of its grip Pakistan focused on diplomatic tricks at the UN. And it is at the UN that one battle after another was being fought out between the big powers like the US, China, and the Soviet Union. It was a diplomatic battle of unprecedented intensity.
On December 4, just a day after India was dragged into the war, George HW Bush, who was then the US ambassador to the UN, offered a resolution for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Indian troops in East Pakistan.
Gary J Bass, an American journalist, in his book “The blood telegram” wrote, Bush, without condemning Pakistan for its genocide, rather attacked India for war on Pakistan violating UN charter.
The US resolution won eleven votes with only the Soviet Union casting a veto. The situation went to such an extent that US secretary of state Henry Kissinger warned the Soviet Union that “we are at a watershed in our relationship” while US president Richard Nixon wrote to Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev complaining about soviet role against Pakistan.
As the Security Council bogged down over the issue it was sent to the UN General Assembly on December 6.
The next day, December 7, was a defining moment for the birth of Bangladesh as 104 countries voted for a resolution placed at the General Assembly by Argentina for cease-fire and withdrawal of Indian troops. In this war at the UN, India looked like a forlorn fighter winning backing only from the Soviet Union, a few Soviet allies and Bhutan totaling only 11 votes, a tenth of what the US and China had together. Fortunately, General Assembly resolutions are not binding on UN members; otherwise it would have rendered Bangladesh’s independence a pipe dream.
Along this time the US had embarked on a dangerous and risky move that would have drawn more countries into the war in Bangladesh. As Gary wrote in his book, Kissinger proposed three initiatives. “The US would illegally allow Iran and Jordan to send squadrons of US aircrafts to Pakistan, secretly ask China to amass its troops on the Indian border, and deploy a US aircraft carrier group to the Bay of Bengal to threaten India.”
Evidently Pakistan was aware of this move hoping for US and Chinese intervention in the war as was clear from a message sent to Niazi from Pakistan army chief of staff Abdul Hamid Khan: “for your personal information, United States Seventh Fleet will be very soon in position. Also NEFA front has been activated by Chinese” (Hamoodur Rahman Commission report).
The USS Enterprise carrier group sailed first towards the Bay of Bengal. Gary in his book informs us that Kissinger told Bhutto that US warships would soon cross the chokepoint of the Strait of Malacca, heading for the Bay. However, the Jordan and Iran parts of the plot were not executed.
While the world was on edge over the flashpoint of Bangladesh, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister, quickly went to the UN to plead on a proposal for ceasefire placed with the assistant secretary general Paul Mark Henry on December 10. Pakistan’s intention was very clear. It needed some time to replenish its strength to renew the fight and a ceasefire would effectively deny the birth of Bangladesh.
When the debate started at the Security Council, the Soviet Union vetoed thrice on the motion for ceasefire, shooting down the Pakistani move to avert surrender.
A US resolution was also vetoed by the Soviet Union. And On December 15, just a day before Bangladesh won its freedom, a Polish resolution called for an immediate ceasefire and troops withdrawals.
“Such a resolution, if adopted, would have been disastrous for India,” wrote Lt General JFR Jacob, who was the chief of staff of India’s Eastern Army during the war, in his book “Surrender at Dacca: Birth of a nation.” He continues: “Fortunately for us Bhutto on December 15 tore up his copy of the resolution, denounced the United Nations and stormed out of the session.”
This was a crucial moment as the Soviets, weary of intense international pressure, had indicated that they might not be able to veto again in future and that India must finish the work before any more move at the UN.
Bhutto, his hands jerking in front of him like those of a marionette, fumed at the UN.
“Mr. President, I am not a rat. I’ve never ratted in my life,” he ranted. “I have faced assassination attempts. I’ve faced imprisonment. Today I am not ratting, but I am leaving your Security Council.”
“I find it disgraceful to my person and to my country to remain here a moment longer. Impose any decision, have a treaty worse than Versailles, legalise aggression, legalise occupation–I will not be a party to it. We will fight. My country harkens for me.
“Why should I waste my time here in the Security Council? I will not be party to the ignominious surrender of part of my country. You can take your Security Council; here you are. I am going.”
Then he tore up the resolution, pushed his chair back and walked out with tearful eyes.
Outside the chamber, he said: “I hate this body. I don’t want to see their faces again. I’d rather go back to a destroyed Pakistan.”
The Council met twice again in the evening where the Chinese and Soviet delegates were the main speakers. They bitterly accused each other of playing power politics.
In the second session, the delegates from Britain and France introduced a joint proposal calling for a ceasefire and for a comprehensive political settlement between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
Soviet Union also introduced a resolution calling for a cease-fire and a “simultaneous” political settlement.
It was evident that Dhaka’s fall was imminent and that the Soviets were buying time on India’s behalf.
“Many of these diplomats have been assuming that the Soviet Union, which has been supporting India, would permit the Council to act once Dacca had fallen,” The New York Times reported on the 15th December events.
The Council adjourned around midnight without a vote until “tomorrow.”
But “tomorrow,” December 16, 1971, turned out to be another story. “Tiger” Niazi had turned into a cat and meekly surrendered to the Joint Forces of Mukti Fouz and India.
