A modest proposal

There is no doubt that the country is divided in the middle. We can argue endlessly about the root cause of this divide and why there has been no consensus on vital national questions or issues. We can also argue why politics has become so violent even in the name of democracy, the only political system designed to settle disagreements and conflicts in a non-violent manner, following the famous dictum, “agree to disagree”.

This piece is not about the causes that have unfortunately divided the nation, but about how to arrive at some consensus on vital national issues and make politics less violent. Here I propose two track solutions – one based on the findings in political science and the other based on economic rationale of incentives. Each independently addresses two puzzles – extreme violence among political activists even when (a) they are socially connected and (b) the economy is expanding.

Let me start with political science, in particular Robert Putnam’s concept of social capital and civic community to suggest a way out of the first puzzle. Putnam’s civic community is characterized by: Political equality; Civic engagement; A strong associational life; and Solidarity, trust and tolerance.

According to Putnam, ‘public affairs are more successfully ordered’ in a civic community or society with these characteristics than where they are absent. Thus, he concludes, democracies (and economies) ‘work better when there exists an independent and long-standing tradition of civic engagement’.

Putnam’s social capital refers to connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them. In other words, social capital is closely related to what some have called “civic virtue”; but “social capital” calls attention to the fact that “civic virtue” is most powerful when embedded in a network of reciprocal social relations. Thus, a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not necessarily rich in social capital.

Given the above analysis of Putnam one finds violence and extreme aggression among our politicians puzzling. Many of them are virtuous people; many come from an extended family structure and many are socially connected through marriages. One would have thought they could settle their disputes peacefully or come to some sort of agreement through their social interactions or extended family relationships.

Therefore, it seems to me that the answer to poor social capital in Bangladesh lies not in the absence of “a network of reciprocal social relations”, but in the fault-lines of civic engagements or associational life.

Applying Putnam’s framework to India’s Hindu-Muslim riots data, Ashutosh Varshney of Brown University USA has found a particular kind of civic interactions that is favourable for the prevention of large scale ethnic violence. In India, where Hindu-Muslim relations have been problematic, especially since its colonisation by the Western powers, large scale ethnic violence is not present in cities with significant presence of civil society engagements connecting the community across ethnic lines. With multi-ethnic civic organisations, a mechanism is in place for clearing inter-communal misunderstandings and preventing the outbreak of all-out violence.

On the other hand, civic organisations along ethnic lines, such as Muslim or Hindu barbers or lawyers’ associations not only fail to act as clearing houses for inter-ethnic misunderstandings, but instead become the centres where such misunderstandings can find fuel to become explosive.

Bangladesh society is politically highly polarized; ethno-religious and other ascriptive characteristics are absorbed by political differences. In short, everything is political in Bangladesh and the available type of civic engagements only connects people within each of political groups. In such a polarized society, mere social interactions among professionals of different political persuasions at social events or wedding ceremonies are not sufficient for preventing sparks of political activities from becoming a fire.

Therefore, learning from Varshney’s finding from India, what Bangladesh needs to address political violence is civic engagements that bridge the society across political affiliations. It is through repeated and long-term civic engagements of professionals, such as doctors, teachers, lawyers and other crafts, within their respective professional organizations that national consensus on major national issues can emerge.

For that to happen, associations or organisations of professionals along political party lines must not be allowed. Only then can we build bonds of civic trust and enrich our social capital.

Let me now turn to economics. How do we find economic incentives to prevent political violence when the economy is expanding? In other words, what would change our politicians’ “winners take it all” mentality or stop them from playing a “zero-sum” game?

Devising economic incentives is not difficult when the pie is expanding. Here the proposal from Professor Salim Rashid of the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign merits serious consideration.

According to Professor Salim Rashid, all Government contracts be handed out to each political party according to the numbers they gain in the popular vote. For example if parties A, B, C, D, get 35, 35, 20 and 10 per cent of the vote, this is the ratio in which each party will get Government contracts. To avoid fracturing contracts, this should apply only to all parties that get a certain minimum (say 2 per cent) of the popular vote.

In this system, each party would have the incentive to make effective use of their contracts, since the performance of their appointees will be compared with those of their rivals. Since all opposition parties will have economic goods to share after the election, the incentives for destroying the property of the people will be much diminished; the desire to slow economic growth will be lessened since all parties are sharing according to the numbers they managed to convince.

The system will also have beneficial impacts on the working of democracy and governance. Since political parties would be judged on their performance in implementing Government contacts given to them transparently and explicitly according to their shares of votes, they will have the incentive to outdo one another in establishing their credentials as competent and honest or not corrupt. In addition, smaller parties would have an incentive to maintain an independent voice which is crucial for ensuring transparency and good governance.