Is Egypt a lesson for Bangladesh?

What’s happening in Egypt has lessons for Bangladesh. One is that performance in governance matters, whether of “secular” or “theologically” inclined parties. Another is that army arbiters (Shogun) behind civilian thrones don’t give up power easily. Detoxification is difficult.

Let’s start with performance. The Morsi government was inept. So is Hasina’s Awami League. Its inefficiency, corruption, high-handedness and vindictiveness have alienated large sections of Bangladesh society, as losing the municipal elections attest.

It requires a special kind of talent to turn the AL’s asset of overwhelming parliamentary victory in 2009 into a liability in 2013. Too much of a good thing can induce narcissistic self-adulation and arrogant disdain for others.

Extrapolating this trend suggests that the AL should probably lose the forthcoming general elections hands down. There is little it can do to check or contain this outcome, especially as its leaders and foot-soldiers face a crisis of morale.

Napoleon said that morale is to the material as three is to one. An army marches on its stomach. But it wins wars largely on superior morale. This in turn is grounded in a solid cause, sound leadership, proper and sufficient equipment, effective organization and above all public support.

First, it can enact reforms to strengthen the party organisation by purging its leadership (rumours of Ashraf resigning?). Second, adopt a robust manifesto emphasizing its glorious past (independence struggle), future egalitarian and broad-based economic and social growth and development and harping on the dangers of fundamentalism, especially the marginalization of women.

The drawback of the first approach is it’s likely too little and too late. Replacing the crew of a leaking boat during a storm is dangerous, likely to be chaotic and may not persuade the public. Changing the helmsman is impractical. Even if there were candidates, who’d want this job when the rudder is jammed and the boat’s adrift?

The second approach is like changing the menu, not the management or chef, of a restaurant that has lost customers through bad food and poor service. It’s unlikely to work.

Whether or not the next elections are held under a caretaker government is the core issue of Bangladesh politics over the next few months.

In sheer self-preservation, Hasina will insist on holding it under the current government with her in the chair. Capitalizing on the recent expression in public opinion, Khaleda will be equally adamant on a caretaker government.

This air-tight impasse can only be broken if either Hasina or Khaleda will give in on the mode of holding elections. This is unlikely.

The AL, running scared, will have even less of a chance of avoiding defeat if it gave up the seat of power with its access to material and intangible advantages.

By the same token, Khaleda, will reject any non-caretaker arrangement, smelling

victory and believing public opinion to be in her favour

The AL will be very active organisationally, moving heaven and earth and using its superior financial resources—gathered internally over the past four years and supplemented externally by Delhi—to persuade, cajole and buy votes.

The bureaucracy and security services will be used to intimidate the opposition. But these two agencies may not play ball, as their corporate interests probably override fealty to the AL, especially taking account of public opinion.

The BNP may not have to be quite so active since the wind of change is in its favour. It’s likely to follow a policy of leaving well-enough alone without relaxing the pressure on the AL. So there’ll be fewer hartals and more political campaigning against the AL’s shortcomings.

So who in Bangladesh can break this impasse? This is where the services factor comes in. The Egyptian Army’s political and economic power is entrenched, extensive and of long duration (over 30 years, and longer if Nasser is considered).

Our Army’s position is not the same. But its “unofficial” role as a limited “balancer” and “lender of last resort” in national affairs will gain resonance if civilian political performance remains belligerent and dysfunctional.

In this case, the impetus to cite, as the Egyptian Army did, “historical responsibility” of protecting the national interest as a spur to intervention can’t be overlooked.

Do nothing, stay on the sidelines, let the politicians’ fight spill over into the streets, straining law and order (hartals; street fights; gunfire and explosives) and economic solvency (rising prices; devaluation; shortage of commodities), till a fed-up public cries for intervention.

Second, it can, with external blessing (probably Washington and EU, not necessarily Delhi—but who knows?), force the political leaders to agree on a formula that involves a modified caretaker arrangement, with direct military involvement restricted to overseeing election management, as in 2009. The prospect of hanging could concentrate minds.

The third is to take over the government with the sole purpose of holding a transparent election, with UN and other national observers present, no later than 30 days of assuming power.

All three options are unpalatable. The cure could be worse than the disease. But the prospective negatives from the current impasse are unacceptable.

We’re stuck between a rock and hard place and will soon know whether mufti, khaki, or some combination of the two will prevail.

The author is a free lancer.