The insistence on extradition helps keep up the illusion that the government is making every effort to bring Hasina back, while actually avoiding having to make the tough decisions that would be associated with her actually coming back
Former prime minister Sheikh Hasina’s low-intensity campaign to re-enter the political arena appears to be escalating. Her announcement four months ago that she would return voluntarily in December, had caught many people off guard. Now, in another roll of the dice, her UK-based lawyers have requested the government to issue a new passport for Hasina.
Many are wondering, why now? The answer may lie in the very nature of the country’s politics itself.
Hasina may well be worried that, as time passes and the post-2024 political dispensation entrenches itself, the Awami League (AL) would find itself increasingly isolated and its support base drifting. With its activities banned and many leaders jailed, the AL could be in danger of losing touch with its rank and file.
In the brutally transactional politics of Bangladesh, if the AL remains absent on the ground for a long period, unable to provide patronage as well as political direction to its members, then the party would be in risk of erosion, with members moving onto other parties.
Jamaat and NCP have been mobilising their support base across the country for the past few months, and one would expect them to ratchet up the agitation at the first sign of leniency towards Hasina. These two parties are BNP’s “natural allies” in their efforts to keep the Awami League out of the political scene.
It is possible that Hasina, seeing the current drift as existential, has decided to act. Step one was to announce a date for return. The next step took place on 9 November. This is more about her own future, but there is no denying that AL’s future is intertwined with that of its leader.
The lawyer’s letter
The debate about the future of the deposed former prime minister reached a frenzied state when news broke that the London-based law firm, Matrix Chambers had written to the Bangladesh High Commission in Delhi, requesting the authorities to issue a new passport and NID for Sheikh Hasina.
The letter has come in for some criticism in Dhaka, where it’s been pointed out that the proper process for applying for a passport or NID has not been followed. However, Matrix’s lead barrister on this matter, Steven Knowles acknowledges this in his communication.
“We would be grateful if the High Commission could examine the matter and advise us of the necessary formalities and documents necessary to expeditiously process the applications,” the letter says.
In other words, the actual application process would begin after the government has “examined” the matter. The letter looks to be the opening move in what could be a series of exchanges, but Hasina’s lawyers are requesting for an “expedited” process.
The letter has triggered much discussion on the legality of issuing passports for a convicted “fugitive.” This legal debate, however, misses the point.
The decision by Muhammad Yunus’ interim government to revoke Hasina’s passport was a political one. Similarly, a decision to issue — or refuse to issue — a new passport by the BNP government would necessarily be a political one.
As has happened many times in the past including 2024-26, the law would be interpreted to reflect political realities and compulsions, not the other way round.
Extradition as policy
The government’s reaction so far has been rather messy, with various people making comments, apparently without much cohesion or coordination. But the underlying message appears to be one of resistance.
As the state minister for foreign affairs Humayun Kabir has insisted, Hasina can only return as a “criminal,” to be sent back by India under the terms of the Extradition Treaty.
If Kabir’s statement is the definitive position of the government, then a new passport for Hasina would not seem to be on the cards at present. At least for now.
One can argue that Hasina knows her road to Dhaka is blocked. One can question why she would want to return anyway, knowing the only thing waiting for her is the hangman’s noose.
These questions have created a doubt in many minds that Hasina’s return schedule is nothing more than an effort to re-energise her party rank and file, and to keep herself relevant in the political arena.
While it is certainly legitimate to doubt Hasina’s sincerity, it would be foolish not to consider an alternative scenario where she is actually working according to a carefully planned strategy. Her return to Bangladesh — even if it means immediate arrest and imprisonment with no chance of bail — would appear to be an essential part of this strategy.
Since 9 November, there has been an uptick in acts of sabotage and defiance — in the form of sudden, small protests, blocking of rural roads, fire-bombing of public transport, random explosions of crude bombs etc. These are likely to have been hit-and-run acts, though the AL have denied responsibility for the fire bombings.
Hasina’s strategy
Hasina appears to be following a three-pronged strategy: firstly, engage with international public opinion through interviews in foreign media and lobbying by legal firms like Matrix.
Secondly, create engagement locally and put pressure on the government through requests for travel documents. And thirdly, ratchet up AL activism in as many districts as possible, through a mix of sabotage and political actions.
The question then moves from “why now” to “what for.” What might Hasina expect to gain from returning?
For starters, Hasina’s return and likely imprisonment would ease much of the ill-feeling that may have affected some of her party workers, who felt let down by the leadership in the aftermath of the uprising of 2024. Even in jail, Hasina’s presence would undoubtedly re-energise party rank and file, and put an end to any effort — if there was any — to float an alternative leadership.
In the minds of AL supporters, Hasina would come across as a leader who puts the party’s survival before her own life and liberty.
The government’s insistence on extradition does not match its stated desire to implement the death sentence passed against Hasina by the International Crimes Tribunal on 17 November 2025. Why? Because there is zero guarantee that India would be willing to extradite a former prime minister who had been their closest ally until 2024.
The extradition process itself could take months or even years, even if the Indian authorities pursued it with all seriousness which they are most unlikely to do.
BNP in a bind
All indications are that Hasina’s stated desire to return has put the BNP government in a tight spot. Despite their public bravado, they must be aware that extradition is a dead-end. Its leaders talk about hanging Hasina, but they are surely aware that this is something easier said than done.
For starters, Hasina is 80 years old and a woman. Hanging an 80-year old woman is unlikely to help the government’s efforts to present a new, clean, liberal image. Is the BNP ready to carry such a burden?
Politically, Hasina’s execution would present severe challenges. Hasina leads one of the two largest political parties in the country. Ban or no ban, Awami League still retains a large following. Then there are the legacy issues. Hasina is the daughter of the country’s founding-father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and served 20 years as prime minister.
Would prime minister Tarique Rahman shoulder the responsibility of executing such a person? He’d have to carry the baggage for the rest of his political career.
On the other hand, allowing Hasina to return and then not executing her would carry a heavy political price too. Even if Hasina was denied bail and kept in jail, there is little doubt that the right-wing of the BNP, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the NCP would be outraged by any concession given to the former prime minister.
Risky gamble
Jamaat and NCP have been mobilising their support base across the country for the past few months, and one would expect them to ratchet up the agitation at the first sign of leniency towards Hasina. These two parties are BNP’s “natural allies” in their efforts to keep the Awami League out of the political scene.
Tarique Rahman would be loath to antagonise them at a time when the AL may well be gearing for a re-entry into the political arena.
In this context, the best scenario for the BNP would be for Hasina to stay out of the country. But, for public consumption at least, they also need to keep up the rhetoric about implementing the death sentence. Hence, the extradition card.
This insistence on extradition helps keep up the illusion that the government is making every effort to bring Hasina back, while actually avoiding having to make the tough decisions that would be associated with her actually coming back.
The big question that remains, however, is what Sheikh Hasina’s likely action would be, in the event the government rejects her request for a passport. The current thinking in Dhaka appears to be that she will cancel her return and blame it on the government.
This line of thinking assumes that whatever has happened since 10 July have all been a charade and Hasina never meant to return in the first place. This could well be a short-sighted view to take, given that Hasina has staked her leadership credibility in this project. For Hasina, it is a gamble fraught with risk, but it is a risk she probably sees no way of avoiding at this juncture.
The writer is a journalist and podcaster. Email: sabir.mustafa@gmail.com. X handle: @Sabir59
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of The Business Standard.
Source: https://www.tbsnews.net/features/panorama/hasinas-passport-ploy-puts-bnp-tight-spot-1603596
