A few days ago, Netra News published a story about a UK undercover police officer spying on a pro-Bangladesh grouping in London in 1971 . This group, known as Operation Omega, was seeking to provide humanitarian aid to people in erstwhile East Pakistan, the former undercover officer revealed to a public inquiry in November of this year.
Some people may have been surprised about one detail in the story – the undercover police officer telling the inquiry that one of the groups involved in the pro-Bangladesh grouping was a group called the Young Haganah, an organisation comprising people who had supported the establishment of the state of Israel.
With Bangladesh being one of 29 countries that does not recognise the state of Israel – it has a resolutely pro-Palestinian policy – and goes as far as prohibiting its citizens from traveling there, the idea of a pro-Israel group supporting the establishment of Bangladesh back in 1971 seems rather shocking, even contradictory.
Little known within Bangladesh, however, is that in 1971, the Israeli government not only supported the establishment of Bangladesh rhetorically but also provided crucial weapons, arms and training to the Mukti Bahini, Bangladesh’s independence fighters.
One example of the Israeli government’s rhetorical support for Bangladesh took place in June 1971 – a few months after the Pakistan military’s crackdown in Dhaka – when Israel’s foreign minister, Abba Eban, made a full-throttled speech in its parliament, the Knesset. Here is an excerpt
“I welcome the initiative of members of the Knesset to bring to full expression Israel’s deep shock at the terrible acts perpetrated by Pakistani Army in East Bengal. It is important and necessary that we should express our sympathy for the sorrows and tribulations of the people of East Bengal and the refugees escaping, hungry and sick, across the Indian border. I welcome this initiative on this important problem. It is difficult to measure precisely the size of the catastrophe which has swept that country, but there is no doubt that this is the largest and most terrible human spectacle on earth at this time. The regime of Yahya Khan has so far prevented foreign observers and journalists from investigating the true situation freely or reporting upon it in public. News of events in East Bengal are therefore drawn largely from eye-witnesses and the stories of refugees, and while the full details of facts are not known, the general picture is as clear as it is terrible. There is a dark and cruel tale of death and destruction, persecution and torture, which has overtaken young and old, men and woman. Without elaborating of the long and sorry background to these events, I would not only [say] that ever since Pakistan was established, inhabitants of the Eastern wing have felt discriminated against. The feelings of bitterness and frustration which this maltreatment caused over a long while found expression in the results of the recent elections. The Awami League, the national party of East Bengal, won a majority. In defiance of generally accepted principles of democratic society. President Yahya Khan rejected the demands of the leader of the Awami League to consider the result of the elections when establishing the government and determining the internal regime of the province. In the face of this refusal, the Awami League declared the independence of Bangladesh. ”
Actual material support from Israel in the form of military assistance has been documented as well. The book “1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh” , for example, published in 2013 by the Indian scholar Srinath Raghavan provides intriguing insights.
The foreign nation that is most known for supporting Bangladesh’s independence in 1971 is of course the neighbouring India. It was also India that negotiated and managed Israel’s military assistance to Bangladesh’s freedom fighters, the Mukthi Bahini.
When Bangladesh’s independence war started in March, India had a policy of “recognition without relations” with Israel. Although in September 1950, India has formally recognised Israel, it refused to institute normal diplomatic relations with the country. The principal driver for India’s policy was its desire not to antagonise Arab states, as a result of its own dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. However, during its war of 1962 and 1965 with Pakistan, India did obtain from Israel small quantities of weapons and ammunition.
Soon after the Israeli minister’s Knesset speech, India found itself in need of vital weapons and ammunition – “especially heavy mortars to support the Mukti Bahini’s operation”, according to Raghavan. As other countries were unwilling to help, India turned to Israel who had assisted in the past in previous conflicts.
The process started with Indian Ambassador in Paris writing in July 1971 to the Ministry of External Affairs stating that in terms of assistance with “propaganda, finance and even procurement of armament and oil”, Israel’s support would be “invaluable”. He suggested that India should quietly send a consul to Israel.
Rangavan says in this book that Indira Gandhi did not want to go so far as to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel – a move she thought would further isolate India in the Arab world – but did agree to reach out. The book notes:
“The conduit was the armaments firm Establissements Salgad, which was based in Liechtenstein and manufactured weapons for Israel among other countries. Delhi New Delhi’s request in the summer of 1971 was a tricky one. The only stocks available with the firm were destined for Iran. “
However, the book goes on to relate that the managing director of the firm, Shlomo Zabludowicz, was known to PN Haksar, the principal secretary to the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from his days when he was a deputy high commissioner in London. It is, in fact, on the basis of the late PN Haksar’s papers that we now know the details of Israeli military assistance. The book reads:
“At Haksar’s request, Zabludowicz cut short his summer vacation and flew to London to meet the Indian deputy High Commissioner Prakash Kaul on 3 August 1971. When asked to expedite the deliveries, Zabludowicz ‘promised that as before he will do what is possible and not disappoint you [Haksar]. [The] situation [is] not easy this time because he has to seek your releases from the Israeli army. Zabludowicz has already spoken to the Israeli government and was “hopeful of airlifting ammunition and mortars in September.” He also agrees to send Israel instructors with the first lot. “
It is unclear whether these Israeli instructors actually entered East Pakistan and directly assisted the Mukti Bahini, but this may well have happened.
Israel perhaps saw itself reflected in Bangladesh’s own struggle for an independent state – but what is clear is that Israel’s motive also involved self-interest in that it hoped, as a quid-pro-quo, diplomatic recognition from India. At the end of August, after the consignment of the army was airlifted to India, the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, asked Zabludowicz to:
“[I] nform the Prime Minister, Mrs India Gandhi, that we believe she will know to appreciate our help at a time when they were in difficulties in the past and our complying with their approach now”.
However, Israel would have to wait over two decades before receiving an Indian ambassador.
Bangladesh is far from being the only country that does not recognize the state of Israel, but it must be the only country that does so after Israel provided it crucial military assistance during its own war of independence.
// David Bergman
Footnote : Some may consider this article as an argument that Bangladesh should now recognise Israel. Not so. It takes no position on this question one way or the other. It is simply showing that history is complicated and pointing out that whatever Bangladesh’s position on Israel today, once it had much to thank it for.
