Taj Hashmi
INTRODUCTION
In Bangladesh, a search for a fourth political narrative – for direction and good governance – might be wishful thinking. The poet Mirza Ghalib considered wishful thinking to be unfunny: “Wo har ek baat pe kahna ke yuun hota to kya hota!” (Asking this all the time, what would have happened if this instead of that had happened)! However, it is time the three political narratives, resulting from inefficient governance, corruption, and acrimonious political culture should give way to a fourth, which would focus on good governance, peace, and progress. One is not sure how wishful this wish is!
There are at least three parallel and mutually antagonistic narratives among Bangladeshis on their country, its history, politics, and economy. The proponents of these ideas advocate entirely different perspectives based on varying histories, logic, and levels of ignorance and prejudice about the subject matter. The narratives cannot simply be explained as the nation’s collective identity crisis. They demonstrate the nation’s identity crisis, and also reveal the nation’s political culture, which lacks mutual respect and trust, preventing the Bangladeshis from reaching a consensus among themselves to build a united nation-state.
East Bengal differs from the rest of the South Asian subcontinent in many respects, such as ethnography, topography, and history, collectively impacting the country’s village community and political culture. A geographically isolated riverine and fertile delta was home to some of the richest people on earth, and also was a turbulent land of apparently religious, but corrupt, poor, and unethical people. Almost a thousand years of foreign rule – from the Sena dynasty to the Turco-Afghans, Mughals, and British (1070 – 1947) – alienated the Bengali masses from the state. Thanks to the extortionist nature of the usurping ruling elites for a thousand years, Bengalis indigenized a culture of alienation, corruption, mistrust, and hatred of the state and each other. Unbridled corruption has been caused by their alienation from the state and neighbours. Historically, Bangladesh was never a well-knit homogenous country. Village communities in deltaic East Bengal were isolated from each other. Even today, dialects differ between hamlets thirty miles apart or across rivers. Chittagong and Sylhet, for example, have had different languages for centuries. Papua New Guinea may be the only other country like this. Due to the unique topography of the region, villages (there were virtually no cities until the Mughals) became self-centred, self-sufficient, and isolated due to the hundreds of rivers and dense forests filled with tigers (tiger populations were almost completely decimated only by the early 20th century). The lack of interaction and harmony outside of the village community is explained by this.
In a nutshell, the three political narratives in Bangladesh reflect the peasant mindset of the typical peasant as well as that of the urban “peasant in a business suit”. It is therefore vital that we understand peasant communities, “little traditions of the little communities”, and “mass societies” in order to understand Bangladesh’s factional infighting and mutual hatred. We need to understand the typical “peasant behaviour”, which has been articulated by Karl Marx, Robert Redfield, Ferdinand Tonnies, Eric Wolf, Eric Hobsbawm, Ranajit Guha, James Scott, and others. This refers to peasants’ inability to lead themselves without relying on non-peasant outsiders (also peasants’ class enemies) for leadership, and their lack of trust and respect, and their defiance of the state. The famous empirical studies by Robert Redfield on peasants, especially his Peasant Society and Culture, emphasizes the fact that peasants’ “little traditions” are quite different from the “great traditions” of religion. In Bangladesh, adherents of the “little traditions” of Islam have overpowered the “great traditions,” as they appear in the Qur’an and Islamic history. The bulk of the ulama and the overwhelming majority of Bangladeshi Muslims follow the “little traditions” of Islam, derived from obscurantist Hadis literature and Shariah. The Narrative C helps us understand the deviations from the true spirit of Islam in spite of the fact that it’s not a homogeneous discourse by any homogeneous ulama or Islamic activists.
Ferdinand Tonnies demonstrates, the gemeinschaft (rural community) differs from the gesellschaft (urban society). Gemeinschaft people are faction-ridden, quasi-tribal, and not fully integrated to the state. And as William Kornhauser explains “mass societies”, which run oligarchies controlling “the conditions of life of the many” who have no say in running of the state machinery. Paradoxically, masses do not run “mass societies” and never stage any so-called “mass uprisings” anywhere in the world. Based on historical and empirical examples, Tonnies and Kornhauser demonstrate that rural communities (mostly peasants or Marx’s “rural idiots”) and mass societies are primarily pre-political or violent, lacking mutual trust and respect, clannish, least interactive, least innovative, and distrustful of each other and of outsiders. These are disaster recipes. In addition, we need to understand what famous Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm calls “primitive rebels”, who represent alienated masses without a sense of belonging outside their own locality, village, or district. They are good at staging short-lived and anarchist “primitive rebellions”, not durable revolutions. Their violence is impulsive, but they do not sustain their rebellion, as they are cowards individually and violent anarchists collectively. Immediate grievances stir them up, and immediate solutions pacify them. In sum, the preponderance of peasant/mass culture in Bangladesh, which amounts to barbarism winning against civilization, necessitates the need for a fourth narrative that brings modern/postmodern rationalism, civility, and ways of thinking to the fore of Bangladesh’s collective political culture for the sake of democracy, freedom, and human rights in this premodern, stagnant, and degenerated place.
THREE NARRATIVES OF FRACTURED BANGLADESH
Narrative A)
It was conceptualized and nurtured during the formative years of the Bangladesh movement in the 1950s and early 1970s. A number of left-wing politicians and intellectuals had been champions of this ideology, including Sheikh Mujib. For Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan and Bangladesh, demonizing Jinnah, Islam, and Pakistan became integral to the concept of Bangladesh. With their utter disdain for everything Muslim and Islamic, they glorified Tagore, united Bengal, and Hindu icons of Bengal. According to this narrative, Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan by default for almost a quarter century, and some “Islamist bigots and communalists” in British India and Pakistan’s two wings were allegedly responsible for creating Pakistan in order to promote Islamist supremacy and plunder of East Bengal. Additionally, the hidden transcript implies that “Bengali Nationalism” (the cornerstone of this narrative) could lead logically to Bangladesh’s union with West Bengal and Tripura, or with “Mother India”. Accordingly, “Bengali Nationalism” is deliberately ambiguous to create an Indian-Bengali union. It is all about legitimizing the Awami League by promoting the cult of Sheikh Mujib in order to accumulate power and wealth in perpetuity. Historically, there have been cult worshippers in Russia under Stalin, Germany under Hitler, Italy under Mussolini, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, among others. This is so extreme that all other leaders of all political hues are demonised. There is a long list. In it are Ziaur Rahman of the BNP, Ghulam Azam of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and others. In spite of the fact that Bangladesh was liberated fifty years ago, those who advocate Narrative A believe there are people who are “anti-Liberation” (mostly in the BNP and Jamaat camps) who must be eradicated for the sake of preserving the “spirit of the Liberation War”. Interestingly, that spirit is centred around restoring democracy, freedom, equality, and human rights for all Bangladeshis.
Narrative B)
There is a diametrical difference between narratives A and B. It promotes Bangladesh as a by-product/legacy of the movement for Muslim Bengal and Assam (later subsumed under the Pakistan Movement), led by prominent Bengali Muslim leaders like Fazlul Huq, Maulana Bhashani, H.S. Suhrawardy, and the overwhelming Bengali Muslim population under M.A. Jinnah in the 1940s. There is no merger between Bangladesh and Pakistan in this narrative, which is the oddest allegation put forth by most proponents of narrative A. While Mujib was one of the proponents of Narrative A (although he was never consistent about what he meant by “Bangladesh” prior to December 1971), Ziaur Rahman was the main architect of Narrative B. It is argued that East Bengalis represent a culture that is unique and different from Bengalis and non-Bengalis in India and Pakistan. Moreover, “Bangladeshi Nationalism” represents the culture and ethos of the Muslim majority in Bangladesh. However, Bangladeshi nationalism does not promote Islamic or Muslim nationalism. This is a political ideology that accommodates Bengalis, non-Bengalis, and other ethnolinguistic groups as equal citizens as “Bangladeshi” (not “Bengali”). The narrative also glorifies the National Liberation War of 1971 and celebrates Bangladesh’s independence since a union with Pakistan failed in 1971.
Narrative C)
The third narrative came into being more than a quarter century before the inception of Bangladesh in united Pakistan. Although apparently, Pakistan came into being as a “secular and democratic Muslim Nation-State” through political manoeuvring and the symbolic use of Islam by Western-educated quasi-secular leaders – including Jinnah, Liaquat, Nazimuddin, and Suhrawardy – political Islam-oriented ulama and their conservative followers successfully enthused Muslim masses to support the Pakistan Movement at the grassroots. Throughout this movement, they mobilized them with the intent of establishing an Islamic State, as they believed it existed during the time of Prophet Muhammad and his four caliphs. “Pakistan ka matlab kiya? La Ilaha Illallah” (“What’s the meaning of Pakistan? There isn’t any god except Allah,”) was the main slogan of ulama-led Pakistani campaigns. Among the ulama who desired Pakistan to become Islamic State were Maulanas Shabbir Ahmad Osmani, Ehteshamul Haq Thanvi, and Abul A’la Maududi (who up to 1947 was opposed to the concept of Pakistan). Leading ulama and their followers in both wings of Pakistan floated several political parties to turn the country into a Sharia-based theocracy. The Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), and the Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Islam were at the forefront of these movements.
They opposed Bangladesh tooth and nail until Pakistan disintegrated in 1971. The offshoots of some of the Islamist outfits in Pakistan once allowed to indulge in party politics in Bangladesh, came up with agendas to turn the country into a carbon copy of what Pakistan had become under military dictator Zia ul-Haq with the support of Maududi and his Jamaat. Many clandestine Islamic outfits went underground shortly after the emergence of Bangladesh to plan jihad against the government and polity of Bangladesh in order to turn it into a Muslim homeland. Some Middle Eastern countries and Islamist terror outfits like al Qaeda and its ilk support them in their efforts to establish a Sharia-based government in Bangladesh. Although Islamist parties, let alone terrorist outfits, have no future in the country, they have not shied away from propagating their doctrine of hate and intolerance. Sections of the population – especially secular-educated youths – are enamoured by radical Islamism. Although we have no reason to be alarmed by any impending radical Islamist threat to destabilise the country, their public, and clandestine narratives have been counterproductive and grossly divisive for Bangladesh. It is therefore important to highlight the Third Narrative as a destabilizing force! Lastly, unlike Narratives A and B, Narrative C is not backed by a fairly homogeneous or like-minded group of people. This is merely a concept derived from the wishful thinking of “Islam-loving” people (politicians, scholars, and laymen), which is simultaneously abstract, ambiguous, and incoherent. An “Islamic Order” or “Islam-friendly system of governance” is contested between extremists, liberals, and confused individuals, who cannot agree on its basic tenets, methods, and goals.
Since 9/11, Narrative C (which is not a homogenous monolith) has become a convenient bogeyman for Islamophobic and prejudiced leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary people in the West, India, and Bangladesh. However, Narrative A adherents are quite ambivalent or dubious about how it treats Narrative C. It has been mentioned above that whenever supporting Narrative C people or groups brings rich dividends, Hasina and her people always embrace them, and when politically expedient, the Hasina Regime has executed some of its top proponents as “war criminals”. In May 2013, the Regime showed no mercy to the Hefazat-e-Islam, an upstart faction prompting Narrative C. Hasina’s law enforcers brutally gunned down dozens of Hefazat activists in Dhaka (mostly poor madrasa teachers and students who wanted the enactment of Blasphemy Law in defence of Islam) in the wee hours of the night. Narrative C belongs to a motley group of heterogeneous ulama, who are premodern, quasi-educated, superstitious, and reactionary. They mostly come up with vitriolic agendas to declare certain minority groups –such as the Ahmadiya community — non-Muslim or demand death sentences for atheists and blasphemers of Islam. There is simply no room for them in a civil, democratic society. Most people who support Narratives A and B do not adhere to morality, ethics, or religion, and most people who support Narrative C do not care about corruption in any form or name either.
NARRATIVE D)
Now, how would one define Narrative D or the Fourth Narrative for Bangladesh to jumpstart the process of harnessing it? There is nothing new about this narrative. First of all, we need to define what development is all about. There are more criteria for development than just high per capita income and GDP growth. Rather than being quantifiable, development is an abstract mental state. People in a developed country have good governance, freedom from tyranny and hunger, justice, high ethical values, and respect for human rights. Countries without ethics, freedom, good governance and respect for human rights and dignity are wretchedly underdeveloped. As such, Bangladesh stands out as an underdeveloped country.
We also need to know nations that once were underdeveloped and poor have become developed and rich within a generation. They all shared one thing in common: dynamic leaders and millions of adherents who discarded premodern institutions, values, and systems to become modern developed nations. As well, nations that were once rich and developed become poor and underdeveloped. Bangladesh stands out as an example of a once-rich but now poor nation. However, developed nations do not include entities such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. A sudden discovery of rich minerals is not a guarantee of sustained development. We may very briefly cite three examples from Asia – Japan, South Korea, and Singapore – which very similar to backward countries like Bangladesh had gone through the same or worse predicaments, but became rich and developed countries only by adopting what I call the Fourth Narrative for Bangladesh.
To take the example of Japan, after the Meiji Restoration (1868), the country underwent drastic socioeconomic, political, military, and religious reforms. A large number of Western experts and Western-educated Japanese men helped replace feudal institutions and practices with capitalist and Western values. Modern ethics and ideas replaced the feudal practices of the Samurai class. As much as possible, Buddhist and Shinto religious practices were shunned. Thus, a new Japan emerged by the end of the 19th century. By the early twentieth century, Japan had become a powerful military power capable of defeating Russia. First Asian power to do so in modern times. Bangladesh could even benefit from South Korea’s example more than Japan’s. By the early 1970s, the war-ravaged country had achieved miraculous sociopolitical order and economic growth after suffering greatly under Japanese colonial rule. Up until the 1960s, South Korea was poorer than East Pakistan. It was Park Chung Hee’s dynamic leadership, hard-working Koreans, and generous American assistance that made the miracle possible. As a small country with a small population, Singapore may not be a good example for Bangladesh. Nevertheless, this city state’s experience can teach us what good leadership can accomplish in less than a generation. Under Lee Kwan Yew, a cohort of honest and efficient leaders performed a “miracle” in socio-economic development in Singapore. A sleepy town of fishing villages (which even imported drinking water from neighbouring Malaysia) with a heterogeneous population of Chinese, Malay, Tamil Indians and others that Singapore had been since the British occupation of the island has now one of the world’s highest per capita incomes. Today, it is a developed nation by any definition.
There was almost a total break from pre-modern institutions and systems in all three nations mentioned above. Following their respective revolutionary changes, feudal and precapitalist socio-political and economic systems died out. They managed to contain and crush (to a large extent) corruption and replaced injustice and tyranny with the rule of law, introduced universal and compulsory education for all, promoted the dignity of human beings and dignity of labour, hard work, frugality, self-respect, or attributes of capitalism as envisaged by Max Weber. Following the example of the above countries is essential for Bangladesh. A thousand years of foreign rule resulted in a stagnant political culture and extortion. A far more extortionist British colonial regime dominated it before it recovered from the trauma. As if colonial hangovers and internal quasi-colonial exploitation by Pakistan’s rulers hadn’t already wreaked havoc on Pakistan’s collective psyche! In the post-liberation period, bad governance – possibly with the exception of five years under Ziaur Rahman – has further pushed the country back to square one. It is therefore necessary to develop a new narrative of good governance and social order.
The Fourth Narrative can be summarized as follows: In order to achieve a truly democratic society, every section of the population must be educated on the necessity of embracing democratic institutions, norms, and procedures at every level. It is important to inform people about the concepts of equality before the law and equal opportunities for all. Ministers, members of parliament, judges, senior bureaucrats, military, and police officers must learn from the new narrative that they are not VIPs or above the law. Moreover, they are not entitled to the privileges enjoyed by colonial rulers, judges, bureaucrats, military, and police officers during the British, Pakistani, and post-liberation periods. Ministers, MPs, and government officials should no longer receive extra privileges at the expense of the public exchequer thanks to the so-called VIP culture. The president, prime minister, ministers, elected representatives of the people, government officials, and people across the board should all be accountable to the public. Every citizen, regardless of their socioeconomic status, will be subject to the same law as members of the ruling class, civil and military bureaucracy. The president, prime minister, ministers, MPs, and high government officials will not be entitled to free medical treatment abroad, as has been the practice in Bangladesh since liberation. The taxpayers should not subsidize the cost of building private residences on public land to the members of the ruling classes, MPs, and civil and military bureaucracy. The government will not provide vehicles, drivers, or free fuel to ministers, military personnel, or bureaucrats unless they are required to perform specific duties under special circumstances.
There needs to be a total overhaul of Bangladesh’s constitution and government system. The country must adopt the presidential form of government, a bi-cameral legislature, a modified election system having proportional representation of vote (replacing the prevalent “first past the post”), and decentralize the administration by turning the eight divisions of the country into eight provinces with their own elected governments under governors, provincial legislatures, and high courts. Due to the fact that most highly educated professionals do not participate in elections (and usually lose elections to people with far less qualifications), the presidential system tends to induct honest and capable people to be ministers and advisers.
Finally, Bangladesh must renounce colonial institutions and culture for good. Decolonizing the country’s political culture, institutions, and system of governance is essential. As Hamza Alavi has explained in his famous essay, “The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh”, postcolonial nations with unmodified bureaucracies and militaries have underdeveloped civil societies. Bangladesh must reverse the situation.
CONCLUSIONS
Having earmarked the three narratives as the dominant ones in the country, one must not put them in watertight compartments. A constant seepage of ideas and programmes makes convergences or even common grounds possible among the compartments. Supporters of “secular” Narrative A frequently shun “secularism” in favor of Islam. They never shy away from signing MOUs or dealing with Islamists upholding Narrative C. Narrative B people quite conveniently champion Islamic or Muslim identity as the main identity of Bangladesh. At the end of the day, however, it is the duo of power and wealth that matter most, especially to people clinging to Narratives A and B. Most of them believe in plundering as much as they can in the easiest way, in the shortest possible time. Narratives A and B people have hardly any qualms about morality, ethics, or justice. The overwhelming majority of the middle-and-upper-class people are nouveau riches, still not satiated by their loot and plunder. They are still in the primitive accumulation stage of civilization. Narratives A and B supporters fight each other not because of their phony ideologies, such as the different brands of nationalism, secularism, democracy, or any lofty ideals they uphold in public, apparently. Power and wealth are at stake, and they fight each other to retain what they have. It is, however, noteworthy that the bulk of the Narrative C people are quasi-educated and marginalized lower middle-class people, having some qualms about morality and ethics. They are also emotionally charged, fanatical hatemongers. To them, any slander against Islam matters most. Enacting the Blasphemy Law matters most, mundane matters are secondary. They are satisfied with the crumbs and will accept anyone, even a corrupt dictator like Ershad, who gives lip service to Islam. Once again, Narrative A and B make the best use of Narrative C. Despite being influential, Narrative C plays second fiddle to Narrative A and B.
All three main narratives in the country promote unsubstantiated truths and unaffirmed commitments.
In Narrative A, Mujib is falsely portrayed as the architect of Bangladesh and as the epitome of good governance. The proponents of this narrative portray him as a victim of “anti-Liberation” people’s conspiracy to undo the liberation of 1971. They never impute Mujib’s brutal, autocratic, and corrupt rule to his fall. They find no problems with Hasina’s long tenure as an unelected prime minister, whose regime has been the most corrupt and brutal in the history of post-Liberation Bangladesh. Narrative B, to a large extent, also suffers from nurturing half-truths and lies about Ziaur Rahman and BNP. It also whitewashes the BNP government’s various flaws, corrupt practices and undemocratic rule under Khaleda Zia as prime minister. Narrative C, being the disjointed story of a vast number of heterogeneous groups and individuals – primarily associated with spiritual and political Islam and some opportunistic/pragmatic individuals and groups who do all kinds of crime and anti-state activities in the name of Islam – is the most controversial of all narratives in the country. Although mullahs of all shades and hues are primarily quasi-educated – many of them utterly vulgar and rustic to the extreme – they have been the main spokespersons of this narrative. However, any civil and educated person from anywhere in the world cannot tolerate their ignorance- and prejudice-driven political, religious, or social statements. However, they are highly influential as most Bangladeshi Muslims, poor and uneducated masses as well as highly educated technocrats (who are again least informed about humanities and social sciences) revere them as ulama or “Islamic scholars”. Therefore, they are immune from punishment if they support terrorism or anarchy tacitly or directly. Politicians and intellectuals who support Narratives A and B also use mullahs to their political advantage. These three narratives seem to hold the nation hostage. No legislative, judicial, or executive order can restrain them, and they are beyond criticism. To establish an accountable, corruption-free, and democratic government by educated and enlightened people, Bangladesh must develop the Fourth Narrative. Again, how wishful is this wish, I do not know.
The author is a historian-cum-cultural anthropologist, Taj Hashmi, Ph.D., FRAS, and is a retired professor of Security Studies at the APCSS, US. He has written several books and hundreds of journal articles, and newspaper op-eds. As an analyst of current affairs, and a human rights activist he regularly appears on talk shows about Bangladesh, South Asia, and World affairs. His latest book, Fifty Years of Bangladesh, 1971-2021: Crises of Culture, Development, Governance, and Identity, was published by Palgrave-Macmillan in May 2022.
