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THE turbulence and violence in the neighbouring Bangladesh reflect latent security threats and implications which may well spill over across the border, especially in the sensitive region of the Siliguri corridor. The geographical attributes and cartographic peculiarities of this area create vulnerabilities which can be exploited by inimical elements using non-conventional methods.
This corridor, which links India with eight of its states in the north-east, is formed due to the sudden decrease in width as the Indian territory extends eastwards across the land mass linking north Bengal with Assam and with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh hedging in this area from the west, north and south, respectively. The shortest expanse is 20 km, between Naxalbari on the India-Nepal border and Phansidewa on the India-Bangladesh border. Close to this is the 30-km transit route for third-party trade permitted by India between the border checkpoints of Kakarbhitta in Nepal and Banglabandha in Bangladesh. The Indian territory’s width between Bhutan and Bangladesh is 43 km at its narrowest. Known as the ‘gateway to the Northeast’, major communication arteries, including NH 17 and 27, broad gauge rail lines, oil and gas pipelines and the national power grid, pass through it. The strategic airfields of Bagdogra and Hasimara, important military formation HQs, and the large towns of Siliguri, Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar are located within this corridor.
In the north, this area is over 40 km from the Chinese territory of Chumbi Valley, across the undeveloped mountainous terrain of south Bhutan till the Indian border. However, all along its southern length, it is flanked by the undulating border with Bangladesh as it meanders across the riverine terrain and swampy areas.
Guarding such a border, primarily against illegal immigrants and smugglers, is a herculean task as it is also densely populated on either side.
The conventional threats to the Siliguri corridor appear overhyped. Whether it is the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) through Bhutan or the Bangladesh forces from the south, the Indian armed forces can deter them and may well carry the battle across in the unlikely scenario of hostilities breaking out.
The real threat lies in the unconventional domain. The high volume of illegal crossings driving a rapid demographic change, ethnic assertion turning to insurgency and support for both from across the borders — these are the actual security challenges.
Illegal immigration from Bangladesh has always been the bane of this region. It has impacted the ethnic composition of the populace in towns and villages. It has built up over the years in the garb of labour, domestic workers and petty businesses, including trans-border smuggling. All this provides a human resource for creating unrest in a vital part of India.
A strong vein of Islamic fundamentalism had existed in East Bengal even before and after 1947, when it became the East of Jinnah’s Pakistan. 1971 did not exorcise these elements. Pakistan recognised Bangladesh in 1974. Ironically, Pak PM Bhutto got a hero’s welcome in Dhaka barely three years after the Pakistan army’s infamous Operation Searchlight in 1971, which led to the Bangladesh liberation war.
Khaleda Zia’s tenure from 2001 to 2006 was the high noon of Pakistan/ISI influence with radical Islamists in government. Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami ran terror operations, targeting Indian interests with impunity. Sheikh Hasina did focus on this common enemy, but she could not eliminate the powerful strain of opinion.
Post the regime change in Bangladesh, the emerging alignment between Bangladesh and Pakistan does not augur well for peace and stability in the adjoining regions. The fundamentalist elements who have come to fore in the post-Hasina era would find mutuality of interests with a rogue state like Pakistan, whose ISI, for one, would like to get involved in this part of the sub-continent. This could create turbulence in the adjoining Indian territory that is under favourable ethnic conditions, structured on illegal migrants, with support bases in Bangladesh.
The recent interceptions of suspicious radio signals across the border point at jihadis in Bangladesh working in cohorts with Pakistan’s ISI for nefarious designs against India. A readily available recruitment base of Rohingya refugees gives a further impetus to the launch of anti-India terrorist operations.
The role of guarding the 4,096-km long border with Bangladesh, including the Siliguri corridor, is performed by the Border Security Force (BSF). The largest among the central armed police forces, the BSF is well-structured and well equipped. While there are a few military stations near Siliguri, no army units are deployed opposite Bangladesh, though some formations may have a dual task role on this border.
The Director General-level talks between the BSF and the Border Guard Bangladesh held in New Delhi last week focussed on the contentious issue of erecting border fencing in the remaining areas, attacks on BSF personnel, movement of illegal immigrants, curbing anti-India insurgent groups and smuggling of arms and drugs into India. But all this is as repetitive as it is inconclusive.
The BSF, while doing a stellar job on this border, feels sandwiched between Bangladesh and the Indian villages and towns populated by Bangladeshi illegals and their Indian sympathisers. Any strong check on human trafficking and animal and drug smuggling is strongly resisted.
The focus should be on all issues of concern in this vital corridor. The BSF must be further empowered. The BSF also has the legal sanction to check border-related crimes within 50 km of the IB and this should be done with blazing publicity.
Deterrence and signalling are clear indicators of intent. The army units in the region must carry out public training exercises near the border to give a clear message. This should be done in concert with the BSF. It will be a morale booster for the forces.
Above all, our intelligence agencies need to get their act together, with an ear to the ground. Intelligence failures have often led to initial debacles, leading to blame game. This can be obviated by adopting a thoroughly professional approach in this aspect.
The Bangladesh situation’s possible fallout in the most sensitive part of India must be taken in all seriousness. It cannot be left to the ambiguous and non-tangible confabulations of diplomacy alone. Indian hard power has to be in clear display to protect safety and deter any kind of threat, especially non-conventional threat.
