by Ghulam Suhrawardi
I’ve always said that the more coordinated the efforts of the international community are, the better it will be for democracy in Burma.
Aung San Suu Kyi
A Nation Coming Apart
Myanmar is undergoing one of the most significant state collapses in Asia’s modern history. Four years into renewed conflict, the central government retains control over only a fraction of the country, while multiple ethnic militias and resistance forces dominate the remainder. This fragmentation has produced a humanitarian disaster, fostered transnational crime, and transformed Myanmar into a theater of geopolitical rivalry among China, India, Russia, and the United States. This article examines the internal fragmentation of Myanmar, the strategic significance of its territory, and the competing interests of regional and global powers engaged in what may become one of the defining proxy struggles of the Indo-Pacific.
Myanmar’s domestic crisis has moved beyond an internal conflict. With more than 82,000 lives lost and 3.2 million displaced, the country is widely regarded as a failed state. The government under General Min Aung Hlaing exercises authority over less than one-fifth of the national territory, while the remainder has fragmented into ethnic enclaves, insurgent strongholds, and zones of competing governance.
This political collapse has created an environment conducive to narcotics trafficking, human smuggling, and arms trading. It has also drawn in external actors who view Myanmar not only as a security risk but also as a strategic prize.
Image source: ACLED
Fractured Frontlines
Myanmar today is characterized by multiple armed non-state actors, each with distinct political objectives:
Kachin Independence Army (North): Seeking autonomy or outright independence.
Arakan Army (West): Pursuing a self-governed Rakhine state with secessionist aspirations.
Chin State Militias: Divided among themselves and against the central government.
Karen and Kareni Forces (East): Continuing their protracted struggle for an ethnic homeland.
Shan State Factions: Fragmented between federalist and secessionist visions.
People’s Defense Force (PDF): Created by the exiled civilian government; aims to overthrow the junta and establish a federal democracy.
While the PDF has broad appeal, tensions remain between its federalist goals and the separatist ambitions of ethnic armed groups.
Myanmar as a Proxy Battlefield
The collapse of central authority has made Myanmar a focal point of strategic competition.
China views Myanmar as essential to its geostrategic corridor to the Indian Ocean. It maintains a dual strategy of supplying arms to the junta while tolerating the transfer of Chinese-made weapons to rebel groups, particularly through the United Wa State Army. Its overarching aim is to secure the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and associated energy pipelines that bypass the Strait of Malacca.
India is primarily concerned with cross-border insurgencies in its northeast. It has undertaken intelligence cooperation and limited joint operations with the junta, including drone strikes inside Myanmar in 2025. However, India lacks significant leverage with ethnic militias and has limited economic engagement.
The United States has avoided overt military involvement but provides non-lethal support to the exiled civilian government. The construction of a $248 million consulate in Chiang Mai underscores Washington’s intent to expand intelligence capacity in the region. Reports of a possible supply base in Cox’s Bazaar and consideration of a no-fly zone over Rakhine suggest potential escalation.
Russia continues to provide critical air assets to the junta but faces constraints due to its commitments in Ukraine.
Thailand permits exiled forces to operate from its borderlands but avoids direct confrontation, wary of spillover and Chinese sensitivities.
Image source: Jerry JW Chan
Strategic Significance of the Corridor
Myanmar’s location ensures its relevance in broader Indo-Pacific geopolitics. The 1,700-kilometer corridor from Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal provides Beijing with strategic access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing maritime chokepoints vulnerable to U.S. naval interdiction. Infrastructure investments—including the Kyaukphyu port and Special Economic Zone—are central to China’s energy security and Belt and Road ambitions.
This strategic reality places Myanmar at the intersection of two competing imperatives: China’s need to protect its corridor and Washington’s aim to disrupt it.
Historical Context
The roots of the present conflict lie in Myanmar’s authoritarian trajectory. The 1988 pro-democracy uprising and subsequent Western sanctions pushed Myanmar into closer alignment with China, which supplied billions in arms. Nationalist distrust of Beijing, however, led to diversification toward Russian defense industries.
Following the 2021 military coup, Myanmar again became isolated from the West, deepening its reliance on China and Russia. Yet even within this framework, Myanmar’s military leaders remain wary of being reduced to client status.
Conclusion
Myanmar represents both a humanitarian tragedy and a geopolitical pivot. Its internal fragmentation ensures that no near-term political settlement is likely. For external actors, the stakes are disproportionately high:
For China, Myanmar secures its overland corridor and energy lifeline. For the United States, undermining China’s access to the Bay of Bengal aligns with its Indo-Pacific strategy. For India, stability in Myanmar is directly tied to security in its northeast. For Russia, arms sales provide influence, though capacity is limited.
The interplay of these powers, combined with the agency of local ethnic militias, positions Myanmar as one of the most consequential faultlines in Asia today. What emerges in Rakhine State—where China’s infrastructure and U.S. interests converge—may determine whether the crowded corridor remains a contested space or escalates into a wider regional conflict.
The author is the publisher of the South Asia Journal.
