The IS versus home-grown debate started around late September last year, after the killing of Italian aid worker Tavella Cesare in Dhaka’s Gulshan diplomatic zone, considered one of the safest areas in the city.
Cesare was gunned down on September 28, 2015 by three motorcyclists — whom the police claimed were “hired goons of the opposition BNP-Jamaat alliance that had been out to create anarchy in the country through killing foreigners and minorities.”
Less than one week after Cesare’s murder, a Japanese man named Kunio Hoshi was killed in Rangpur, followed by a series of machete attacks on policemen, members of various minority groups, and bombings on dissenting voices against Islam.
Bangladesh comes in the global media spotlight after every string of such attacks, especially after either IS or al-Qaeda’s alleged involvement in the attacks, according to the US-based jihadi-monitoring group, SITE.
The home minister and police officials were very quick in rejecting SITE’s claims, saying that the Syria-Iraq-based terror outfit IS or al-Qaeda have no foothold in Bangladesh.
The minister and the police were in unison in pinpointing the perpetrators – “home-grown” militants such as Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Ansarullah Bangla Team, the Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Harkat-ul Jihad, Jamaat-Shibir, and so on and so forth.
According to the minister and the police officials, the home-grown militant outfits see an opportunity and use the IS or al-Qaeda brands to add value to their names after every killing — it also works the other way around, it seems.
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has said in Parliament that some “designs are there to prove the presence of IS in Bangladesh.”
Neither the premier nor the minister or the police officials have denied that there are no militants in Bangladesh, as demonstrated by BNP’s actions until the JMB carried out serial bomb blasts in 63 districts (out of 64) on August 17, 2005.
BNP were of the opinion that there were no militants in Bangladesh, and that the media reports on militant activities were aimed at “branding Bangladesh as a militant state.”
But the then opposition, AL, insisted that militants had indeed been active in Bangladesh, right after the August 21, 2004 grenade attack on Sheikh Hasina’s anti-terrorism rally in Dhaka.
AL successfully cashed in on BNP’s tacit support for terror groups and the anti-Indian rebel groups sheltered in Bangladesh. The party comes close to the Western powers and India with its crusades against the anti-Indian groups and militants.
The ruling party, in principle, still maintains its “no militancy” policy, which makes India, America, and Europe happy — AL knows the dangers of acknowledging the presence of foreign terror groups in Bangladesh.
But the government is exposing a serious lack in its fight against militants and extremists. Repeated stress on the term “home-grown” would put the government in a more embarrassing place when it comes to fighting militants.
The series of machete attacks on free-thinking bloggers, writers, and minorities gives an impression that the government is incapable of preventing attacks launched by the militants and that its counter-terrorism efforts are simply not working.
The government should also remember that fighting foreign terror groups such as IS and al-Qaeda is easier than fighting home-grown militants, which is a more tricky endeavour.
There is an old saying in Bangla: “Bahirer chorer songay para jay, kintu ghor chorer sathey para jayna” (you can deal with outside thieves, but not the ones living in your own home).
Source: Dhaka Tribune
