India-Bangladesh security cooperation

Jaideep Saikia

21_narendramodi_sheikhhasina_06062015_0002

If there is one single pertinent question pertaining to Indo-Bangla relations that needs to be raised, then it would unquestionably be how a country whose liberation was ably aided by its larger neighbour India, and in the military campaign for which many Indian lives were lost, acquired a “turn around” and became a hostile nation within a matter of years.

While a mature democracy like India appreciates the imperatives of non-interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation, and consequently did not either “billet” its armed forces in the erstwhile East Pakistan for longer than it was necessary or engineer aggressive diplomacy to dominate Dhaka, the fact of the matter is that the Indira Gandhi led government – for some reason or the other — preferred to turn a blind eye to some of the aspects that were threatening Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s Awami League government. Indeed, it cannot be countenanced that Indian observers of then Bangladesh and the traditional minders of such business (at the time) could not have known that active subterfuges (aided by, some observers aver, by the US!) were afoot inside Savar (the military garrison near Dhaka) to overthrow Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s government.

But such monitoring notwithstanding, the worst took place and India lost considerable ground in the aftermath of the putsch. The coup-de-tat not only overthrew the government and witnessed the assassination of almost the entire family of the Bangabandhu, but in one fell swoop negated the advantages that India had sought to garner after the dismemberment of Pakistan. After all, despite the fact that there were humanitarian considerations in the Indian aid to the freedom fighters of the erstwhile East Pakistan, the fact that the primary consideration that led to the Indian intervention in East Pakistan was to get rid of a two-front enemy is a matter that cannot be denied.The Liberation War of 1971 ensured that.

But as aforesaid, the gains were frittered away, possibly because the dispensation in New Delhi – in 1975 — was occupied with internal strife. In the absence of any intervening force, the radicalisation of Bangladesh began. The country’s garrison politics — without the legitimacy of a mass based political party like Awami League — had to lean on Islam for political sustenance. Furthermore, pro-Pakistani elements that had collaborated with the Pakistan army in carrying out pogroms in the pre-liberation days and had fled the country after it was liberated were rehabilitated. Despite the fact that a large constituency in Bangladesh remained steadfast to the spirit of 1971 and linguistic Bengali nationalism, the military rulers and later the Islamists defined almost every institution in the country on anti-Indian sentiments and consequently Islam, the latter with a strategy to further the India-Bangladesh divide.

War criminals like Ghulam Azam returned to Bangladesh and the Jamaat-e-Islami, of which Azam was the Emir, became a powerful factor in the country’s politics. The growing radicalisation of the country also began linking it with the global Salafi movement and homegrown Islamist groups were soon making their way to places such as Afghanistan to fight alongside the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Indeed, the nexus between a group such as HUJI (Bangladesh) and other Al-Qaeda led Islamist outfits was cemented when Fazlul Rahman, leader of the “Jihad Movement in Bangladesh” of which HUJI (B) is a constituent, signed the official declaration of jihad against the United States on 23 February 1998. Thereafter, Islamist groups such HUJI (B), JMB and JMJB were on the fast track towards converting Bangladesh into another Talibanised Afghanistan, recruiting youths from Assam and thereabouts and sending them to places such as Batrasi in Pak-occupied Kashmir for urban and rural guerrilla training. Clear links — chaperoned by the ISI of Pakistan — were also engendered with ethnic insurgent organisations of the North East, and it was only with both training, safe haven and provision of arms that a group such as NDFB (Ranjan Daimary) was able to trigger off serial blasts in Assam on 30 October 2008.

But history holds its own, and the forces of secularism have returned to power in Dhaka. Relations between India and Bangladesh are once again on an upswing. Indeed, Dhaka has been quick to hand over important Northeast Indian insurgent leaders, including the chairmen of ULFA and NDFB to India. It has also signed deals with New Delhi on a variety of security, cultural and economic fronts. Indeed, the present could well be characterised as a “honeymoon period” between Delhi and Dhaka.

On 26 August 2016 a rare jugalbandi of sorts was witnessed in Agartala. A conclave which brought together senior Indian and Bangladesh security-intelligence officials and security experts ended with a consensus on the source of terror – Pakistan. The conclave discussed concrete steps to further India-Bangladesh security cooperation, discussing everything from real-time intelligence sharing to coordinated operations based on shared intelligence. The officials promised to take back to their governments the proposals put forth at the Conclave and carry them forward in their fight against terror.

One can well say that India-Bangladesh security cooperation is now entering the next phase. From addressing mutual security concerns – handing over of Indian militants by Bangladesh and Bangladesh criminals by India – one is possibly now getting to a stage where Indian and Bangladeshi agencies will operate together, share intelligence, and coordinate operations to deny cross-border terrorists any space. Some of that may already be happening on the quiet but the need is now felt for creating institutionalised structures to cooperate on security issues, specially when it comes to fighting terrorism.

Even a non-alert observer could not help fathom the unmistakable bonhomie that characterised the Indo-Bangla chorus, especially as it was being played out just days after Modi took on the recalcitrant failed state of Pakistan from the rampart of Red Fort in Delhi. It is another matter that the deep state actors in Islamabad were working overtime to define the “crossing of the redline” by Modi. Only this time they had not reckoned on the concrete support that India’s most steadfast neighbour and partner, Bangladesh, was providing its time-tested ally.
India is a thriving democracy, and it is perhaps one of the few countries in the world where free thought, speech and analyses are not only permitted but encouraged. Effigies of elected chief executives are burnt for the simplest of issues, cabinet ministers and bearers of high office do not receive quarter for misdemeanour, and the rule of law is respected. It is in this context that a neighbourhood that has come under the shadow of the so-called “all-weather relationship” of China and Pakistan and other extra-regional subterfuges must be assayed.

There are observers who say that the Doval Doctrine is the spawn of a hawk. But the talons that hover over Rawalpindi and ones that could just as easily descend with severe impunity have not been countenanced by India’s adversaries. High fables hail India as the benevolent elephant. This uncaring attitude is also true for evil, fire-sprouting dragons and hyenas that follow it and scavenge for refuse. The doctrine that Modi-Doval put in place across the sprawling lawn that comprises Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives is one that is being watered with a grace of sagacity and togetherness, and not some sweltering fanaticism or overbearance that Pakistan and China seems to be obsessed with.

Jaideep Saikia is a security expert and author of several books on Terrorism, Northeast India and Bangladesh

Source: bdnews24