Unless the alienated community is socially and politically included, violence won’t cease
Amit Ranjan
The brutal killing of Avijit Roy in Dhaka on February27, 2015, is a recent example of rise of intolerance in Bangladesh. He was a Bangladesh-born-US-citizen, an atheist blogger and founder of a blog called Mukto Mano. According to reports, Ansarullah Bangla Team, an extremist group based in Bangladesh claimed the responsibility for the murder. Before Avijit Roy, in 2013, Rajib Haider was also hacked to death for his blogs that invited people to be a part of Shahbag movement to demand capital punishment instead of life-sentence to the perpetrators of violence during the liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971. Hefajat-e-Islam Bangladesh, which was formed in 2010 to protest against the secular education policy of Bangladesh and also engaged in carrying out violence against protestors at Shahbag, took the responsibility of killing Haider. These two are recent incidents where individuals have been targeted by radical groups. In the past the target killings and attacks on groups have been carried out by the organizations or individuals regulated by their parent body.
The level of violence in Bangladesh has not increased abruptly, rather its roots lie in war of liberation of 1971. In its eastern part, the Pakistani Army and its collaborators unleashed violence against its citizens to mow down the growing dissidence against the state. Those who were fighting for liberation adopted similar means to fulfill their goals. They also got engaged in killing non-Bengalis and carrying out physical violence against their women.
Once the country was liberated from the yoke of discrimination and exploitation, it was thought that the level of violence would be controlled; but it did not happen. Instead structural violence was used to suppress the dissidents. During Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s tenure, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB) was created to fight against the Marxist dissident group, Gonobahini, but the real aim was to silent all dissenters through violent means.
After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib in 1975, General Ziaur Rehman came to power. During his period, Ghulam Azam, who was against creation of Bangladesh and killed many Bengalis during the liberation war, was allowed to return from his exile in London. This was the beginning of radicalism, which strengthened itself in following decades. Both military dictators and political parties, after the democracy returned in 1991, directly or indirectly used the radical groups to serve their power interests.
In 2009, acting on a popular demand, the Awami League government headed by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina reestablished the International War Crime Tribunal (ICT) to try the perpetrators of 1971 liberation war. Though ICT’s work has been appreciated, its verdicts have been a reason to incite violence in Bangladesh. It handed capital punishment despite facing criticism from international human and civil rights bodies.
In reaction to the verdicts, since 2013, JeI and its umbrella organizations have carried out phase-wise violent protests across the country. In a fit of rage, JeI cadres had engaged in hurling petrol bombs and at certain important locations even crude bombs were planted. Also, the ICT members failed to use the platform to discuss and debate a few issues which kept the society boiling. Instead, it issued a contempt of court notice to a journalist David Bergman for expressing a different opinion on the number of people killed in the 1971 war.
Politically, in post-1971 war, an excluded group was created by the state. The liberation war was fought to give space to Bengali identity which is being used to construct an idea of belongingness at the cost of an inclusive Bangla identity. The Hindus have been included because of their Bengali background, but Muslims from central and east India, who adopted this land as their home in 1947, are treated as ‘outsiders’ or ‘aliens’.
Around 161,000 managed to migrate to Pakistan in and after 1971, but most of the members from this group are living in a miserable conditions in seventy camps spread across the country. In Bangladesh they are considered as ‘stranded’ Pakistani citizens, while Pakistan government is not interested in them. In a landmark judgment in 2008, the Bangladesh Supreme Court ruled that the stateless ‘Biharis’ who were minors during the 1971 war or born after – have a right to enjoy citizenship rights. This judgment cleared the legal sanction but not socio-political attitude towards them. Legally they are citizens but of ‘second grade’, so alienated. It is this group which, mainly, provides physical, political and financial support to many radical groups in Bangladesh.
Unless this ethnic community is socially and politically included, Bangladesh is not going to get respite from series of violence acts. Hence, the managers of the state must take decisive political steps to address the situation instead of relying on structural violence.
Source: Rising Kashmir