Obaid Chowdhury, USA
Seven thousand people were gunned down in two days in Dhaka alone following the crackdown by Pakistan military on March 26/26, 1971. It was reported in the International Herald Tribune on March 30, 1971, quoting an eyewitness. Similar massacres were committed in Chittagong, Comilla, Jessore, Khulna, Bogra, Rangpur and Sylhet. Body counts in those places were not immediately available.
How was this sudden carnage possible? Why the people did not know something of that magnitude was coming?
From March 1, 1971, planeloads of troops and weapons from West Pakistan were landing in Dhaka daily. Such was the scene in Chittagong, taking the sea routes. Those ominous military activities could not be unknown to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the undisputed leader of East Pakistan. All civil institutions were under his control. Why was then the genocide allowed to take place?
Sheikh Mujib’s March 7, 1971 speech was a great oration well hyped and well dramatized. Over the past four decades, it had undergone heavy editing, however. Today, we get to see and hear only part of it, the part that seemed relevant to an independent Bangladesh. But it defies the real Mujib.
East Pakistan of March 7, 1971 was different. Bengalis were imbued with a spirit of dedication and sacrifice for their freedom. They were ready to chart their own destiny. Unfortunately, they were misled.
Most observers, who attended the Race Course gathering that day, found the speech largely confusing. Sheikh Mujib came, delivered his 17-minute speech and left the podium in haste, without entertaining questions from a host of journalists.
One lac stick-wielding public came to hear a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from their leader. They did not get it. They were visibly disappointed.
What did the speech mean to the people at that point of time? How were they to take the declaration: “Ebarer sangram, amader muktir sangram. Ebarer sangram, swadhinotar sangram… (Our struggle this time is for our freedom. Our fight this time is for our independence) when he started the same speech with a four-point demand from the Pakistani leadership: Withdraw Martial Law, Take military to barracks, Investigate the killings, and Handover power to the elected representatives?
Vice Chancellor of the Dhaka University Dr. Arefin Siddique said in an interview on March 7, 2013, that it was in fact the “Declaration of Independence.” Really? Making demands to central authority and declaration of independence do not go together. It is either one or the other. And, talking of sangramcannot be called a declaration of independence. People expected a better explanation from a supposed top academic of the country.
Mujib told the gathering, “Tomra ghore ghore durgo gore tolo. Tomader ja kichu ache, ta niye toiry thako…..(Make each house a fortress. Be ready with whatever weapon you have.)” But, within 10 days, the same leader went to negotiate with the military junta to preserve the unity of Pakistan. Was he serious about ghore ghore durgo?
As Sheikh Mujib was talking with President General Yahya Khan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and other Pakistani leaders at the Governor’s House, the military buildup and preparations were continuing in the cantonments. It was no secret. A sensible and patriotic leader would have immediately demanded of his dialogue partners, “Stop bringing in troops or I quit.” He did not.
Instead, Mujib allowed the military to continue sharpening their knives. He did not heed the warning that Bengalis in the military, police and rifles were being disarmed. What could be a clearer indication of what the Pakistani junta was up to?
A captain from Chittagong met Colonel Osmany to inform the political leadership about the military preparations there. Senior Bengali officers like Lt Col M R Chowdhury, Major Ziaur Rahman, Captain Rafiqul Islam and others sought a political blessing if they could counter the Pakistanis before it was too late. Upon told, Mujib retorted that he would not tolerate any military adventurism by Bengali elements while his talks with the central leadership was progressing well. Awami MP Rafiqul Islam and Retired Major General Amin Ahmed Chowdhury may throw further light on it.
Mujib’s repeated assertions of “making progress” in the talks were in the print of the dailies from March 18. March 25 and 26 papers added his “progress” report with the news of a one-to-one meeting with the president, to be held on March 25. People continued to trust him. They thought things were going in the right direction.
According to Syed Badrul Ahsan of The Daily Star, the president was to make a declaration on March 25 about the transfer of power, ostensibly to the majority leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Dr. Kamal Hossain, as the conduit, would receive the details from president’s Principal Staff Officer, General Peerzada.
While Sheikh Mujib eagerly waited the whole day of March 25 for the scheduled meeting, as well as the promised declaration, the president and his team quietly sneaked away in the afternoon, leaving instructions to General Tikka Khan to “teach the Bengalis a lesson.”
Tikka’s teaching mission, the Operation Searchlight, commenced at midnight on March 25, as his killing machinery rolled out of the cantonments. Within minutes, the blitzering firework began.
Bengalis of East Pakistan read the stories of massacres at Jalianwala Bagh in Punjab, Nanking in China and Pearl Harbor in Hawaii (US). The eyewitnesses and survivors of March 25/26 said it had surpassed them all. It was genocide. It was a wholesale butchery.
According to The Time of April 12, 1971, “It’s veritable bloodbath. The troops have been utterly merciless. It was like the Chengis Khan all over again. 80,000 Punjabi and Pathan soldiers slaughtered an estimated 300,000 Bengalis by the end of April.”
And, it was because of the trust the Bengalis reposed on their leader and the ‘good days’ they were promised.
What about the leader himself? He declined the repeated requests of Awami League Secretary General Tajuddin Ahmed, student leader ASM Abdur Rob and many others to join them and lead a war of independence. Sheikh Mujib chose the safe and peaceful exit. A call to the US Ambassador Joseph Farland in Islamabad settled the matter (Please see Witness to Surrender by Siddiq Salek).
Sheikh Mujib was picked up from his residence shortly after midnight. His family, including today’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, received full militaryprotection and lavish hospitality during the entire war period, while the rest of the country was brutalized by the same military.
Newspapers on March 27/28 flashed Sheikh Mujib in the front page. He was at Karachi airport, fresh in white pajama-kurta with his trademark pipe.
Can Sheikh Mujbur Rahman escape responsibility for the military crackdown on March 25/26, 1971? Perhaps he could not stop the Operation Searchlight, but he could minimize the loss and destruction by keeping the military in check and warning the public in advance. He did neither. His eyes were fixed on the coveted seat in Islamabad.
The souls of three lacs or 3 million will keep asking, “Why!?”
Obaid Chowdhury
NY, USA.
E Mail : [email protected]
Source: News from Bangladesh
If the objective of the Pakistan Army was to destroy the Awami League, then why was Shaikh Mujib’s life spared? There are a lot of imtriguimg questions still left unanswered. In an otherwise excellent piece, the writer unfortunately fails to mention the slaughter of innocent non- Bengalis by AL activists that took place during the so-called non- violent non-cooperation movement. The Al also bears a heavy resposibility for this violence and the subsequent heavy-handed retaliation by the Pakistan Army on the minorities in the then East Pakistan.
Dear Rehana,
The “slaughter of innocent non-Bengalis” could be a myth. This was an excuse put forward by the Pakistani Military Junta to justify their actions against the unarmed Bengali people. The junta has mentioned it but failed to provide any evidence. Rather, non-Bengali or Bihari people were let loose to murder and torture the Bengalis and loot their properties after 25 March 1971 in many parts of East Pakistan. These non-Bengalis still wanted to go to Pakistan even after the birth of Bangladesh. However, they were left as stranded Pakistanis and the burden were put on the shoulder of Bangladesh. Pakistan did not take them. Is not this a betrayal? The betrayers are the victim of future betrayals. Irony of history !!!
Mujib was kept alive and well in Pakistan but soon on his return to BD, his own national army killed their ‘father of nation’! And, Hasina Wajed was in Germany when the whole family was slaughtered in Dacca. The AL leadership is entirely Indian by design and so is the anti Pakistan rhetorics there.
A bold and truthful article. Every word said in this article is true but I am also certain that by exposing these truths the author by no means is trying to devalue Mujib’s contributions to the creation of Bangladesh, at the time when Mujib stated his movement was an unintended but eventually, a welcome outcome – regardless of how much we shout to the contrary, all evidence suggest that Mujib’s movement was for an autonomous East Pakistan, and not an independent Bangladesh.
True, Mujib successfully mobilized and united the entire East Pakistan to demand significant autonomy from the centre and thanks to centre’s intransigence the movement ultimately led, as force majeure, to what has come to be known as ‘independence’ movement, culminating into emergence of independent Bangladesh.
As the leader Mujib should have known the ensuing challenge of his movement and in fact was advised of what was coming and thus should have cautioned and prepared the nation accordingly, which he did not that at the end put thousands of unprepared and unarmed people to face guns and bullets of the marauding Pakistani Army.
I thus completely agree with the author that Mujib cannot ‘escape the responsibility’ of deaths caused by his ambivalence to the carnage caused by the murderous Pakistani Army nor as one commentator mentions above, the deaths of non-Bengalis that took place during the period in March 71 when he was the de facto ruler of East Pakistan.
Indeed, while we must continue to salute Mujib for the contributions he made to unite East Pakistanis and forge Bengali nationalism that earned, inadvertently or otherwise our independence we must also at the same time have the courage to acknowledge the mistakes he made.
Merits and mistakes are the two sides of the same coin, defacing of one to highlight the other diminishes its value completely!