This commentary proposes the essential framework of an election time interim government in Bangladesh, an issue that seems to be at the heart of the long ongoing political impasse in Bangladesh. The proposal here is likely to be perceived as honourable by both the ruling party Awami League (AL) and the main non-ruling party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP).
The stalemate commenced in 2011 when the AL-led regime enacted the 15th constitutional amendment to replace the unelected caretaker government (CTG) system instituted under the 13th amendment in 1996. Under the new system, the interim government is to be led by a prime minister and a cabinet, all being members of the parliament in place, but unlike the Westminster style tradition, the parliament may not be dissolved. The BNP refused to participate in the January 5, 2014 election under the new system and the AL won the election nearly uncontested that effectively disenfranchised more than 50% of the electorate.
Given questionable democratic legitimacy of the new government at home and abroad, there is a widespread call for holding another credible election. But the main sticking point still remains, namely, what should be the form of the election time interim government, for any such election and beyond. The principal contention of this commentary is that any proposed solution must (a) be honourable enough for both the AL leader Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and the BNP leader Honourable Ex-Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, and (b) factor in the potential and likely abuse of governance power to influence the conduct and the outcome of the election. Honourable Sheikh Hasina and Honourable Khaleda Zia have been instrumental in returning Bangladesh to the path of representative democracy and they have presided over unprecedented economic growth and enviable social developments. Both of their families have also made great sacrifices and paid dearly in advancing the cause of the nation, albeit in their respective manners. It is only befitting that the personal dignity of the two leaders be upheld in a new interim government system.
With the above in mind, the following are suggested as essential elements of a solution to the vexing problem of a mutually acceptable system of interim government:
Element 1: In accordance with the 15th constitutional amendment, the interim government will comprise of cabinet members, including the prime minister, selected from the members of the parliament elected through the last credible election in which both of the two parties, with most support in the population at large, participated. The number of members in the cabinet, excluding the prime minister, should be in the range of nine to eleven, a size nimble enough for the minimal but efficient functioning of the interim government and also modest enough for efficient management of the appointment and dismissal process described below.
Element 2: The ruling prime minister will, by default, be the prime minister of the interim government. However, as a gesture of good will to the leader of the non-ruling major party and to improve the neutrality image of the interim government, the ruling prime minister may choose not to directly participate in the interim government and instead select another member of parliament of the ruling party to be the prime minister of the interim government. In this case, the new prime minister should preferably be someone who was not a member of the cabinet at any time under the ruling regime.
Element 3: All the members of the interim government cabinet, other than the prime minister, will be nominated by the leader of the non-ruling major party. However, in democratic tradition, a majority of the interim cabinet nominations should be chosen from the members of the ruling party.
3A: The interim prime minister may reject a nomination, but will seek a new nomination within 24 hours of rejection, and will be obliged to accept the replacement nomination from the leader of the non-ruling major party.
Element 4: The interim prime minister will allocate the portfolio of all ministries to the interim cabinet members with the exception of some key ministries, namely, those with the most direct control over law enforcement, civil administration, judiciary, Election Commission and Anti-Corruption Commission. The assignment of these key ministries will be the prerogative of the leader of the non-ruling major party. Under the configuration as of the end of 2013, the key ministries are Law, Home, Cabinet and Establishment.
4A: The interim prime minister can sack a cabinet member, but will have to seek a new nominee within 24 hours and will be obliged to accept the new nominee. Over the course of the interim government, the interim prime minister can sack at most forty percent of cabinet members and can sack cabinet members two times at most for the same ministry. But no ministry can remain unassigned to a cabinet member for more than 24 hours.
4B: The cabinet must be in full strength and neither the cabinet nor the assignment of ministries can be changed any further, starting with 14 days prior to the date of the general election.
Element 5: No major long-term policy decisions can be implemented by the interim government. But the interim cabinet members can undertake administrative changes including appointment and transfer of officials and reassignment of tasks. However, in the case of the key ministries, the interim cabinet could transfer and reassign a maximum of forty percent of the pre-interim government officials at a given level, starting with the district or equivalent level and upward.
Element 1 above concerning the 15th Amendment is the signature constitutional reform by Honourable Sheikh Hasina and it is also a valuable step forward for the maturation of the democratic process in Bangladesh. The previous CTG system cannot possibly be a long-term solution.
Element 2 is the principal unofficial demand of the AL. Displacement of Honourable Sheikh Hasina as the Prime Minister until she is defeated electorally is absolutely unacceptable to the AL since this reflects negatively on her commitment to a free and fair democratic process.
Element 3, on the other hand, is pivotal to retain the dignity of Honourable Khaleda Zia, two time Prime Minister herself before. Although the BNP-led alliance won only ten percent of the seats in the parliament in the 2009 election, their support at the popular level was and still remains at par with the AL if not more. Contrary to parliamentary tradition, Honourable Khaleda Zia and her party have not been included with due importance in the reconfiguration process of a new interim government system. Perhaps they are also apprehensive of Honourable Sheikh Hasina engineering the process to return the country to a de facto one-party (BAKSAL) democracy.
Elements 2 and 3 together should bring about balance of interim governance power between the two major parties and between Honourable Sheikh Hasina and Honourable Khaleda Zia, and would also make the interim government truly an all-party one.
Elements 4 and 5 are intended to address the concerns about the non-neutrality of a partisan interim government and the associated abuse of governance power for electoral purpose. These two elements attempt to institute a system of check and balance in the use of interim governance power while retaining sufficient flexibility to undertake changes that may be desirable. They should act as disincentives for the ruling party to strategize the governance apparatus, ahead of the interim government. Similarly, the non-ruling major party would also be aware of their limitations in reshuffling the interim governance apparatus in their favour. Overall, a much needed sense of confidence may return in the interim government system on the part of all parties.
In conclusion, the proposed interim government framework is expected to be useful in negotiating a solution and breaking the current deadlock that, if persists, can be quite detrimental for Bangladesh. Ultimately, there is no perfect solution and there will never be one. Hopefully the compromise solution articulated here would be seen as acceptable enough by the principal contenders since it builds into it the preservation of the due dignity of both Honourable Sheikh Hasina and Honourable Khaleda Zia and their parties.
Source: Bd news24
