The Biman Bangladesh Airlines’ ambition to ultimately build a fleet of around 100 aircraft may sound like the natural dream of a national flag carrier of a populous country with a large expatriate community. But an airline does not become globally competitive simply because more aircraft are parked on its apron. The latest agreement for 11 additional Boeing jets has taken Biman’s Boeing order book this year to 25 aircraft, while negotiations are continuing over another 10 Airbus planes. Biman at present operates 19 aircraft, according to recent reports. So, the scale of the proposed expansion is indeed unprecedented.
But does Biman’s basic business challenge lie in shortage of aircraft alone? In truth, it does not. An aircraft is merely the most visible part of an airline business. Behind every plane flying profitably lies a complex system of route planning, ticket pricing, marketing, crew management, maintenance, ground handling, baggage delivery, customer care, digital reservation, airport slots and, above all, professional management. If those parts do not work efficiently, adding aircraft may only multiply the existing inefficiencies. That is why some aviation experts raised the basic question as to whether routes and demand had first been assessed before the aircraft were ordered.
Normally, a commercial airline first decides where it wants to fly, how much traffic those routes can sustainably generate, what fares the market can bear and what competition it will face. Only then does it determine the number and type of aircraft necessary. It appears, at least from what has so far been made public, Biman is doing the exercise partly in reverse. No consolidated business case has yet been publicly released showing how the incoming fleet will be deployed, when the older aircraft will be retired and how each proposed route will make money.
To be fair, Biman is no longer the perennial loss-making entity that it once was. In FY2024-25, it reported record revenue of Tk11,559 crore and a net profit of Tk785.21 crore, marking its fifth consecutive profitable year. That is definitely encouraging. But the latest 11 Boeing jets alone were valued at about US$2.42 billion at 2023 catalogue prices, though actual negotiated prices and financing arrangements have not been disclosed. The earlier order placed last April for 14 Boeing aircraft was worth about US$3.7 billion. Evidently, the financial magnitude of the expansion bears little comparison with Biman’s present annual profit.
This is why the question of who will ultimately shoulder the financial risk cannot be brushed aside. Since Biman is a fully state-owned company, any major procurement undertaken without a watertight commercial case may finally become a liability of the public exchequer. A national airline has strategic importance and governments everywhere may support their flag carriers in special circumstances. But support cannot become a substitute for commercial discipline. Expansion should increasingly be financed by Biman’s own earnings, retained profits, commercially sustainable borrowing and cash flows generated by viable routes-not simply by the taxpayers because an aircraft purchase happens to serve some diplomatic or political purpose.
The timing of the Boeing deals has naturally invited questions because Bangladesh’s aircraft purchases have also figured in discussions surrounding trade relations with the United States. Government representatives have said there was no US pressure and that the purchases were based on aviation needs. Whatever the diplomatic context, the test for Biman should remain strictly commercial. The considerations should concern if the aircraft earn more over its economic life than it costs to acquire, finance, crew, maintain and operate.
Here lies the still larger issue of management. Biman’s weaknesses arising from bureaucratic control, political interference and irregularities are hardly new discoveries. A Transparency International Bangladesh diagnostic study identified political influence, corruption risks in aircraft purchase and leasing, weak planning and poor passenger service among its governance problems. An Anti-Corruption Commission enquiry later identified corruption-prone areas in Biman. More recently, internal investigations reported serious weaknesses in revenue collection and contract management in Covid-era cargo operations involving hundreds of crores of taka.
Then there is the passenger, whose experience should finally determine the worth of an airline. Biman has frequently faced complaints over delayed baggage delivery and ground handling, while the government itself this year ordered stronger action against luggage theft, passenger harassment and weaknesses in ticket sales. A new aircraft with a gleaming cabin does not compensate a passenger for an avoidable delay, mishandled luggage, poor communication or indifferent service at the counter. Airlines sell confidence as much as they sell seats.
Moreover, if the proposed Airbus purchase goes ahead alongside the large Boeing acquisition, Biman will operate a more complex mixed fleet. Such diversification may have advantages, including negotiating leverage and aircraft types suited to different routes. But it also means separate pilot training, engineering expertise, spare-parts inventories, maintenance arrangements and possibly additional simulator and certification requirements. For a carrier already grappling with management and manpower limitations, complexity has a cost.
So, before dreaming of a 100-aircraft fleet, Biman needs first to put its management, operational model and quality of passenger service on a sound commercial footing. Otherwise, it would amount to putting the cart before the horse. The government should consider engaging an internationally reputed aviation management consultancy, not merely to prepare another glossy report, but to redesign Biman’s operating model from route economics and fleet planning to human resources, procurement, maintenance, customer service and digital revenue management.
Such restructuring should be followed by measurable targets: aircraft utilisation, on-time performance, load factor, yield, baggage-delivery time, unit cost, route-wise profit and passenger satisfaction. Management should then be given professional autonomy to meet those targets and held accountable for failure. Ministers and bureaucrats should set broad policy, but day-to-day airline decisions are best left to aviation professionals.
Once that foundation is laid, fleet and route expansion can proceed step by step. New aircraft should follow proven demand, not precede it. Profitable regional and Middle Eastern routes can be strengthened first. The long-haul destinations should be added only after rigorous market tests and partnership arrangements are secured. A 100-aircraft Biman may well be possible one day. But the real ambition should not be to own 100 aircraft. It should be to build an airline capable of operating every aircraft profitably, efficiently and with a standard of service that makes passengers choose Biman even when they have other options.
Source: https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/columns/bimans-dream-fleet-of-100-planes
