Iran and Israel: A contrasting tale of two nuclear programmes

“Iran would be infinitely more dangerous than North Korea should it develop nuclear weapons,” Benjamin Netanyahu once said. He also said, “A nuclear Iran would be a threat to the entire world. They chant ‘Death to America,’ ‘Death to Israel’ — we cannot let those who threaten genocide acquire the means to achieve it.”

Ironically, he is spearheading the most widely documented genocide in history.

And for decades, the Western World, particularly the US, has been regurgitating the same sentiment over and over again.

In 2015, US President Barack Obama said, “A nuclear-armed Iran would be a threat to the region, a threat to the world, and potentially an existential threat to Israel.” In 2023, President Joe Biden echoed, “A nuclear-armed Iran would lead to an arms race in the Middle East and pose an unacceptable threat to global security. We remain committed to ensuring Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.”

However, the country they are so eager to protect is also running a nuclear programme, which is hidden under the shroud of ‘strategic ambiguity’. By tolerating Israel’s nuclear ambiguity while punishing Iran’s compliance, the West has shown that its idea of ‘security’ is selective.

Why the double standard? Why the selective application of principles when it comes to Iran, with zero nuclear weapons and Israel, armed to the teeth with a nuclear triad?

Interestingly, Iran’s nuclear programme actually began with strong backing from the US during the Cold War era. Under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s rule, Washington actively supported Iran’s nuclear ambitions as part of its strategic alliance with Tehran. The 1957 “Atoms for Peace” agreement between the two nations marked the starting point, with America providing both technology and materials to establish Iran’s first nuclear research facility.

The US directly supplied highly enriched uranium (93%) to fuel Iran’s Tehran Research Reactor, which became operational in 1967. This reactor, built with American assistance, remained dependent on US fuel for decades. Iran, encouraged by Washington, joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1970 as a non-weapons state — a move supported by its Western allies.

By the 1970s, with US approval, the Shah aggressively expanded Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. The Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI) was created in 1974, and the Shah announced plans for a vast nuclear energy programme, including 23 nuclear power plants.

Western companies, backed by their governments, rushed to secure lucrative contracts: Iran invested heavily in France’s Eurodif enrichment project, while Germany’s Siemens began constructing the Bushehr nuclear plant in 1975. Additional deals were made with French firms for reactors and fuel cycle technology, including uranium processing facilities at Isfahan.

The same infrastructure and expertise later became the foundation of Iran’s controversial nuclear activities under the Islamic Republic.

The 1979 revolution, which replaced the monarchy with an Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomeini, fundamentally altered this dynamic. The new regime’s anti-Western rhetoric, its support for revolutionary movements, and the hostage crisis at the US embassy in Tehran transformed Iran into a perceived adversary.

The US and its allies began to view Iran’s nuclear ambitions as a potential threat, particularly given the regime’s ideological opposition to Western influence. This shift in perception was less about Iran’s technical capabilities and more about the ideological and geopolitical rift that emerged post-1979. The US and its allies, wary of Iran’s new foreign policy, began to impose sanctions and restrictions, framing Iran’s nuclear programme as a global security risk, despite its earlier endorsement.

Israel’s nuclear programme, in contrast, operates under a policy of deliberate ambiguity, neither confirming nor denying its possession of nuclear weapons. This stance, coupled with its non-signatory status to the NPT, allows Israel to maintain an estimated arsenal of 80 to 200 warheads without international oversight. In fact, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) states that Israel has been modernising its nuclear arsenal while upgrading the existing weapons and delivery systems.

Yet, Israel’s nuclear status has not faced significant Western criticism, despite its involvement in actions that violate international law, such as its 2007 airstrike on a Syrian nuclear facility, its ongoing occupation of Palestinian territories, its genocide in Gaza, and its military operations in Lebanon and Syria.

Western support for Israel, particularly from the US, is rooted in strategic considerations: Israel is seen as a reliable ally in a volatile region, a counterbalance to adversaries like Iran, and a key partner in intelligence and military cooperation.

This alignment has led to a de facto “blank cheque” for Israel, with its nuclear arsenal tolerated as a necessary deterrent against existential threats, despite its non-compliance with international treaties. And the said blank cheque has empowered Israel to get away with genocide today.

The contrast with Iran is stark. While Israel’s nuclear programme operates outside international scrutiny, Iran’s adherence to the NPT subjects it to rigorous inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Yet, Israel’s aggressive actions — such as its 2025 strikes on Iranian nuclear sites — are often justified by Western powers as pre-emptive measures to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities.

A key justification for denying Iran nuclear weapons is the fear that such capabilities could fall into the hands of terrorist organisations. This concern is rooted in Iran’s historical support for non-state actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups designated as terrorist organisations by Western governments. The argument posits that a nuclear-armed Iran could either deliberately transfer nuclear materials to such groups or fail to secure its arsenal, allowing rogue elements to acquire them.

However, Iran has not engaged in direct warfare in recent decades, focusing instead on proxy conflicts and asymmetric strategies. Its nuclear programme, which Iran insists is for civilian purposes, is subject to IAEA monitoring, and there is no definitive evidence that Iran has sought to weaponise its nuclear capabilities.

Moreover, Iran’s leadership is aware that any use of nuclear weapons — whether directly or through proxies — would invite devastating retaliation. Former US President Jimmy Carter noted in 2014 that Iran’s leaders would likely view such an action as “self-destructive” given Israel’s overwhelming nuclear superiority.

In contrast, Israel’s nuclear arsenal, while not linked to terrorism, operates without similar safeguards. Its policy of ambiguity and refusal to join the NPT means there is no international mechanism to verify the security of its stockpile. A 2014 UN General Assembly resolution urging Israel to join the NPT and allow inspections passed overwhelmingly but was ignored by Israel, showing the utter lack of accountability for non-signatories.

Yet, the West does not raise similar concerns about Israel, reflecting a bias rooted in geopolitical alignments rather than objective risk assessments. The fear of nuclear terrorism, while valid in theory, appears to be selectively applied to Iran, ignoring the broader context of regional nuclear dynamics.

Iran’s nuclear programme has been subject to international agreements, most notably the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which imposed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief.

Under the JCPOA, Iran complied with IAEA inspections, reducing its uranium stockpile and limiting enrichment levels to prevent weaponisation. However, in 2018, then-US President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew from the agreement, citing its inadequacy in addressing Iran’s ballistic missile programme and regional influence.

The US withdrawal from the JCPOA had significant repercussions. It eroded trust in international agreements, as Iran faced renewed sanctions despite fulfilling its obligations. While Iran faced consequences for alleged violations, Israel’s non-compliance with the NPT and its refusal to allow IAEA inspections have not prompted similar repercussions.

The US’s unilateral action under Trump further undermined the credibility of international governing bodies, suggesting that powerful states can disregard multilateral agreements without consequence.

This double standard raises questions about the integrity of the global non-proliferation regime. The NPT, designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, relies on consistent enforcement and mutual trust. When it fails, it just becomes the rule of the jungle where the strong do what they want, the weak suffer what they must — certainly not the best look for the rule-based world order.