— The Best Sea
Mohammad Abdur Razzak : HISTORICALLY, the Bay of Bengal was not frequented by war ships of extra regional powers. It did not witness many hostilities at sea. During World War II, Britain deployed ships at the mouth of the River Naf to bombard the Rakhine coast of Burma, now Myanmar, to stop the advance of Japanese forces.
In 1971, India and Pakistan’s naval engagements were the most significant in recent history. India lost its frigate INS Kukri and Pakistan lost its submarine Gazi. After the sinking of the Gazi, the Bay of Bengal saw one-sided Indian naval operation. India imposed a blockade of then East Pakistan. Aircraft carrier Vikrant flew unfettered combat missions over the sea and land of the then East Pakistan. The India-Pakistan war of 1947 and 1965 and India-China war of 1962 did not extend into the Bay of Bengal.
In 2008, Bangladesh and Myanmar were on a confrontational course following Myanmar’s attempt to construct a oil rig in the disputed waters. The situation did not turn into hostilities as Myanmar withdrew from the disputed waters.
Apart from the naval events, the Bay of Bengal generally remained quiet, but the future may be different from the past. The rise of China as a political, economic and military power has triggered the new round of great power politics in the Bay of Bengal. The United States and its allies in Europe and in the East Asia are worried at China’s rise. India is concerned at China’s growing influence in Asia and naval presence in the Indian Ocean Rim.
In the game of maritime power politics, a nation can have tactical to strategic vulnerabilities at sea. The principal victim of this vulnerability is the country’s maritime trade. Asian waters have a couple of choke points through which regional and global trade pass. The Taiwan Strait is an important waterway. Approximately, a half of the world’s container ships pass through the Strait. Taiwan’s economy is fully dependent on maritime trade. This small and narrow waterway is often heated up by the US and Chinese naval manoeuvres. There are Malacca Strait between Malaysia and Indonesia, the Lombok Strait and Makassar Strait in Indonesia and Six degree channel between Indira Point at Great Nicobar and Rondo Island in Aceh Province in Indonesia.
All nations have stakes in the Malacca strait. Twenty-five per cent of global trade passes through the Malacca Strait. China imports 75 per cent of its national petroleum consumption and about 60 per cent of it passes through the Malacca Strait. It is the primary route for Chinese navy ships to go to the Indian Ocean. The Strait is equally important to countries in Southeast and East Asia. Malacca Strait is also the primary route for US navy’s Centcom and the Indian navy to go to South China Sea and beyond.
Going to the west, there is the Strait of Hormuz, globally famous narrow waterways for passing petroleum supplies from the Persian Gulf. There is Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea which is recently back into spotlight for Houthi attacks against Israel-linked ships in response to latter’s crimes against Palestinians.
Economic power is the life-line of a nation’s political and military power. International trade boosts economic power. Economic power widens the political and military sphere. China is the hub of global supply chain and its economy has been on the rise and ranks second, next to the United States. In the 1960s, Japan’s economy was second to the United States and was catching. The United States successfully contained Japan. It ranked the fourth in 2023 in global economic ranking. The United States is yet to contain China’s economic growth. The economic war between the two began. Pulling a country into an armed conflict is another containment strategy. But, there are a lots of risk factors associated with it. The United States wanted to weaken Russia pulling it into war with Ukraine. But things did not go as planned. By the end of the second year of the war, US strategy seems to be leaving Ukraine alone but keeping the war alive to keep Russia busy.
The larger is an economy, the broader is the dependence on the maritime frontier. China’s incremental economic growth has made it more dependent on the sea than any time in the history. China is exploiting options to offset its geographical weaknesses. It has powerful adversaries at its courtyard and backyard which can disrupt its sea lines of communication.
China seems to have taken two-pronged strategies to mitigate maritime risks. To protect trade and reduce dependence on narrow waterways. The Ream Naval Base in Cambodia on the coast of the Gulf of Thailand and naval base in Djibouti on the Red Sea are ready response units to protect trades. Myanmar’s Great Coco Island is back in discussion because of naval infrastructure developments on the Island. India suspects Chinese involvement in the development of naval facilities on the island. India is also concerned about China’s potential intelligence collection using Myanmar’s surveillance assets on the island. Beside widening naval presence, China is also taking non-military measures to reduce trade vulnerabilities at sea.
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is such an initiative to reduce dependence on the Malacca Strait. Myanmar is another source easing out China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait. China has built strategic petroleum tank terminal on Maday Island in the Kyaukphyu district of Rakhine State. China has built 752km oil and gas pipeline from Kyaukphyu to Kunming in China. Pipelines from Maday Island discharge about 240,000 barrel crude oil per day and 12 billion cubic metres gas annually into China. Despite these projects, China’s dependence on the Malacca Strait is very high.
China is building a huge economic zone on the Ramree Island in Rakhine State. To provide an opening to land locked eastern China, it is building road and high-speed rail link between China-Myanmar border town Ruili and Ramree Island on the Bay of Bengal coast. Khayukphyu is set to become an extended coast of China.
China is Myanmar navy’s strategic development partner. The Myanmar navy with Chinese help has been on the quick march since 2000. It is building mega naval infrastructures. The 400 metres long and 120 metres wide dry-dock, abutting the naval shipyard at Thanlyin in Myanmar being constructed to dock larger vessels. Will China station naval ships in Myanmar? Will Myanmar Navy be China’s proxy in the Bay of Bengal? Will a conflict across the Taiwan Strait or in the South China Sea turn the Bay of Bengal into a battle ground. Answers are conditionally open to probabilities.
Mohammad Abdur Razzak, a retired commodore of the Bangladesh navy, is a security analyst.
New Age
