Caretaker government and institutional resilience

In recent times there have been encouraging and laudatory pronouncements on the socio-economic achievements of Bangladesh. Positive comments testifying to our economic resilience have come from Nobel winning economist, internationally credible media and reputed think-tanks.

While these reactions may cause justifiable pride, there are, however, concerns about our inability to affect acceptable and peaceful modality of holding national elections with a view to transferring political power.

Additionally, there are doubts about the integrity of our governance apparatus and its impact on public good.

Experts are at a stance that the staying power of democracy varies from country to country. There is a view that the timing of political breakdown depends upon the strength of political institutions; and that collapse may not take overtake a country marked by economic failure where the political institutions have acquired durability through age and tradition.

The question is: Are there dangers in a society characterised by fragile institutions and a constitution which is looked upon by politicians as so pliant that it can be bent to any whim or caprice of the ruling class? This premonition arises in view of the potential stalemate over the issue of revival or otherwise of the neutral and non-partisan caretaker government, constitutionally incorporated but subsequently struck off, to oversee the general election.

Coming to specifics, is there much substance in the complaint that the caretaker government concept in Bangladesh would not have been necessary if the concerned State institutions acted firmly at the given time; when demands were made to ensure fair election?

To recollect, that brings us to the now-infamous Magura bye-election to the parliamentary seat in 1994. There were allegations of large-scale governmental interference in the run up to that election.

From the reports appearing in the media at that time it was abundantly clear that the Magura election had become a political caricature. An upright Chief Election Commissioner could have declared postponement and called the contesting parties to behave. The law enforcing agencies including the Armed Forces could have been mobilised to ensure fair election. However, the then CEC, a member of the higher judiciary showed no signs of firmness leading others to call “it timidity, some indecisiveness and yet others termed this as a misplaced legal formalism.”

The CEC was physically present on the spot in Magura and thus he did not need any report to assess the seriousness of the situation that demanded drastic action. It is only proper to say that the CEC is mandated by the Constitution to supervise and conduct the elections.

Legal experts are of the view that the CEC “has all the powers even beyond law to do all that is necessary in the ends of free and fair election” and “so long as he does not act arbitrarily, or do anything that is prohibited by law his actions are immune from challenge.”

A cardinal point highlighted in support of the movement for revival of caretaker government is the alleged partiality of public servants towards the incumbent political government, if election is held under such government. The question is if and why public servants have become so pliant that they stand ever ready to execute irregular and illegal orders of their political bosses in clear violation of their constitutional obligations and functions.

If we retrace our steps then we will find that the concept of an independent body to recruit public servants free from political influence, to the extent possible, got firmly rooted in the constitution in the Indian sub-continent; later adopted by Pakistan.

At independence, we had a model to follow, quite clearly signifying that there are some elements in the principles of governance in a democratic country which are more or less immutable over time and space. Using the term colonial, as is done by many enthusiastic politicians and academics, in a pejorative sense, does not actually serve any useful purpose.

In Bangladesh, unfortunately, the issue of merit-based selection process in the civil service did not warrant adequate attention in the political establishment. It lost its homogenous character quite early which is so vital for the morale of the service and the element of the espirit de corps that are necessary to maintain adequate working relationship and environment.

Successive political governments have shown utter indifference to civil service reform measures. There are apprehensions that the lurking distrust on the part of political leadership may have prompted them not to have a merit-based administrative system.

In fact, the political government and the public service commission have never stood up to ensure quality of recruitment of civil service. Between 1982 and 1992 the quality was compromised in the name of meeting urgent situations. We have not realised that it is not in the interests of a strong and mature political government to create and sustain a pliant and cringing bureaucracy thereby crippling the State institutions.

No wonder we find ourselves mired in a situation wherein we cannot trust our public servants to act fairly and neutrally under a political government. Quite clearly to our peril the nurturing of service ethos has not been allowed.

While the caretaker government system is undeniably an unfortunate indictment of the unreliability of the political class, the fact remains that the arrangement drew the supreme judiciary into politics. In such an arrangement the role of political chief executive of the Republic contained the danger of distorting the constitutional scheme in which the Supreme Court exists and exercises its power and jurisdiction.

The need, therefore, is to foster and cherish the professional growth and sustenance of the institutions of the Republic to ensure harmonious political succession.

Source: The Daily Star