TBS
On 10 July, the Appellate Division, led by Chief Justice Obaidul Hasan, issued a four-week status quo order on quotas in government jobs — an order the students outright rejected
After the 2024 elections, the Awami League was upbeat. They had vanquished the opposition’s march for democracy, defied US pressure to hold a participatory election, and yet everything seemed to fall back into place. The US, too, appeared to soften its tone, adopting a more reconciliatory stance and signalling engagement with the government of the day.
Sheikh Hasina’s government felt confident — enough to overturn the 2018 circular that had cancelled the freedom fighter quota in government jobs, declaring it illegal. Unsurprisingly, the Awami League accomplished this through the courts.
In 2018, faced with massive student protests, the government issued a circular abolishing all 56% of the quotas — despite the fact that jobseekers had only demanded reforms, not the complete dismantling of the quota system introduced in 1972.
But in 2024, the High Court directed the government to reinstate 30% quotas for the children and grandchildren of freedom fighters in government jobs — sparking fresh protests that eventually escalated into a nationwide uprising against Sheikh Hasina, leading to her downfall.
While the court directive was issued on 5 June, larger waves of student agitation did not begin until July — after students returned to their campuses after the Eid vacation. Before leaving for home in June, students had issued an ultimatum for their demands to be met by 30 June.
They had roughly three to four key demands: forming a commission to review and reform the quota system; preventing the repeated use of quota privileges in job examinations; filling vacant posts based on merit if no qualified candidates are found within the quotas; and implementing effective measures to ensure a corruption-free, impartial, and merit-based bureaucracy.
As students returned to their campuses after the Eid vacation, they responded to calls for protests against the court ruling reinstating the quota.
From the beginning of July, students united under the banner Students Against Discrimination (SAD). The platform was formed and largely coordinated by the then Chatra Shakti leadership from Dhaka University, who now lead the National Citizen Party (NCP).
NCP Convener Nahid Islam, who was then serving as an SAD coordinator, called on students across universities to rally under the SAD banner.
On 2 July, a day drenched in rain, just like many other days of that month, giving rise to the term ‘Monsoon Uprising’, Nahid spoke at the Shahbagh blockade, explaining why quotas and the spirit of Bangladesh’s Liberation War were not the same thing.
This was an important clarification, as the Awami League has long exploited the narrative of Bangladesh’s glorious Liberation War to serve its political interests and extend its power through three successive farcical elections.
“We are not speaking specifically against the freedom fighter quota. Rather, we are speaking out against all irrational quotas, including the special treatment given to descendants. It is crucial to remember that the freedom fighter quota and the spirit of the Liberation War are not the same thing,” Nahid said.
Hundreds of students began blocking the Shahbagh intersection from the onset of July. What started with hundreds soon grew into thousands, and the duration of the blockade gradually increased – so did the number of blockade points across other parts of Dhaka and throughout Bangladesh.
Throughout the first week of July, it seemed unlikely the movement would extend beyond campus areas — especially since opposition political forces were deeply demoralised following their failure to prevent yet another engineered election. However, people across the country began to see a glimmer of hope as students poured into the streets in ever-growing numbers, gradually overcoming the fear that the AL had instilled in the nation for over 15 years.
Throughout the first week of July, it seemed unlikely the movement would extend beyond campus areas – especially since opposition political forces were deeply demoralised following their failure to prevent yet another engineered election.
However, people across the country began to see a glimmer of hope as students poured into the streets in ever-growing numbers, gradually overcoming the fear that the Awami League had instilled in the nation for over fifteen years.
“At first, the movement against the quota seemed insignificant,” said Abu Bakar Shaim, a student leader from Dhaka College and founding member of the July Massacre Archive. “But by the end of the first week and with the announcement of the Bangla Blockade, it became clear that this was going to be something significant.”
It did grow big, of course, but activists like Abu Bakar never imagined it would swell into a national uprising that would topple Sheikh Hasina and her autocratic regime.
“When we realised this was more than a fluke and was bound to bring real change, we fully committed to the movement – and ultimately succeeded in bringing about that change,” Abu Bakar said, referring, of course, to the ouster of Sheikh Hasina and her party members.
The major push across the country began on 6 July, as students blocked key highways, including Dhaka-Rajshahi, Dhaka-Pabna, Dhaka-Tangail, Dhaka-Rangpur and others.
Then came the “Bangla Blockade”.
While blockades had proved ineffective as a political tool during the BNP’s months-long anti-government movement and push for democracy before the 2024 elections, the term “Bangla Blockade” seemed to carry a certain magic, and it worked remarkably well.
Nahid announced that, on 7 July, they would block not only the Shahbagh intersection as before but also several other major points across the capital, including Science Laboratory, Chankharpul, Nilkhet, and Motijheel.
True to their word, the blockade paralysed Dhaka, with students gathering at all the major intersections throughout the city.
Throughout the July uprising, the student leadership’s list of demands shifted frequently – sometimes listing three or four points, later expanding to nine, and eventually narrowing down to a single, clear demand: the removal of Hasina.
During the Bangla Blockade, Hasnat announced, “Now we have only one demand – that all illogical and discriminatory quotas in public service be scrapped by law in parliament, while retaining a minimum quota for backward citizens in accordance with the constitution.”
The government tried to play from its old playbook, for example, claiming this was simply a court decision.
“There is no point in showing us court,” Nahid was candid, highlighting how Sheikh Hasina herself clearly supported the quotas that benefit her party’s supporters. Nahid announced the blockade would continue – and it did, for several more days.
On 10 July, the Appellate Division, led by Chief Justice Obaidul Hasan, issued a four-week status quo order on quotas in government jobs — an order the students outright rejected.
At the moment the court delivered its decision, this correspondent was covering the student blockade at Shahbagh, where Hasnat Abdullah was speaking. He described the ruling as a tactic to suppress the nationwide movement. The student bodies made it clear they demanded the decision come from the executive, not the judiciary.
“We don’t accept the court directive; we demand answers from the executive,” Hasnat told this correspondent at the Shahbagh intersection after his speech.
Years of Awami League’s manipulation — through politicised courts and puppet institutions — were clear to the students; and they played the ball as per its merit.
By then, the movement had spread like wildfire, and it was clear to everyone that these protesters would not return empty-handed — except for Hasina and her supporters.
That is why Hasina persisted with her arrogant, overexposed tactics, daring to label the protesting students as “Children of Razakars,” which only fuelled the flames of protest across Bangladesh.
In the midnight of 14 July, female students broke through the gates of Dhaka University’s halls, and students across the country took to the streets, embracing Hasina’s tasteless insults as armour for their protests, chanting, “Who are you? Who am I? Razakar, Razakar.”
Since then, the simple protest slogans — such as “The essence of the Liberation War is equality of opportunity,” and “Quota or merit? Merit, merit” — gradually faded as the movement took on a clearer objective: toppling the system of repression and dishonour built by Sheikh Hasina.
And she ultimately paid the price for her arrogance and autocracy.