CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS:
In “1970 Cyclone (Nov 12-13) with cyclonic surge of 3.05-10.6m high with wind speed of 222 km/h occurred during high tide causing most appalling natural disaster claiming 0.3 million human lives.”
Nov 14 Bhasani declared “Ora Kau Asheani”(Pakistani rulers didn’t come to our help)
November 23, at Polton ground he declared, “ Hail independent Bangladesh” and he dissolved the All Pakistan NAP, formed the East Bengal NAP and declared the independence of East Bengal. (2)
7th December 1970, when Pakistan’s National Assembly Election took place
“ … the Awami League, the largest East Pakistani political party, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won a landslide victory in the national elections. The party won 167 of the 169 seats allotted to East Pakistan, and thus a majority of the 313 seats in the National Assembly. This gave the Awami League the constitutional right to form a government.(3)
Beginning of Civil War
“ Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (a Sindhi), the leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party, refused to allow Rahman to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Instead, he proposed the idea of having two Prime Ministers, one for each wing. The proposal elicited outrage in the east wing, already chafing under the other constitutional innovation, the “one unit scheme”. Bhutto also refused to accept Rahman’s Six Points.(4)
“Bhutto’s reaction and Yahya’s postponement of the assembly” was seen as a betrayal and as proof of the determination of the army and of the West Pakistan authorities to deny [East Bengalis] the fruits of their electoral victory.”
March 2. In a statement on 2 March Awami League called for a five-day general strike (hartal) throughout East Pakistan.
“Dacca, Khulna, Jessore and elsewhere in a number of clashes between [Bengalis and the non Bengalis] and demonstrators and looters, in which the army opened fire on unarmed civilians. The Pakistan authorities later stated that a total of 172 persons had been killed in this period, but some of them were killed in intercommoned clashes.” (5)
March 3, “the army were ordered to return to their cantonments and remained there until March 25. The Pakistan authorities say that their purpose was to avoid further clashes during the period of negotiation. Some have suggested that the army were holding their fire until they were ready to strike, but this seems unlikely as few, if any, units were flown into East Pakistan between 4 and 25 March. Whatever the reason for the withdrawal, it had the effect of keeping down the violence in a period of extreme tension.”(6)
March 3 “… Serious riots in Chittagong on and after the night of 3 March, and some less severe incidents on the same day at Jessore and Khulna. The events at Chittagong on the night of 3/4 March are described as follow in the Pakistan White Paper:”(7)
‘At Chittagong, violent mobs led by Awami League storm troopers attacked the Wireless Colony and several other localities, committing wanton acts of loot, arson, killing and rape. In one locality (Ferozeshah Colony), 700 houses were set on fire and their inmates including men, women and children were burnt to death. Those who tried to flee were either killed or seriously wounded. Apart from those burnt alive, whose bodies were found later, over 300 persons were killed or wounded on 3 and 4 March.(8)
“According to information received from foreign nationals in Chittagong, which is believed to be reliable, the incident began when Bengali demonstrators passed in procession through Bihari areas in order to make the Biharis keep to the hartal. The demonstrators were fired upon by Biharis, and a serious riot followed in which people were killed on both sides and a substantial number of Bihari houses were burnt.” (9)
“On March 3, President Yahya Khan invited 121eaders of the main political groups in the newly elected National Assembly to meet at Dacca on 10 March in an effort to solve the crisis. Sheikh Mujibur rejected the invitation the same evening and started issuing a series of instructions or’ directives’ to implement a’ non-violent and non-cooperation movement ‘. These included an injunction not to pay taxes.” (10)
7th March Speech. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s historic 7 March “if” (Jodi Akta Goli Poree) Speech saying if another shot is fired there will be parting of ways. “The general expectation was that he would then declare the independence of Bangladesh.” “On 7 March. Sheikh Mujibur replied by putting forward four demands, which had to be accepted before the Awami League would consider attending the National Assembly. These were:
(I) Immediate withdrawal of martial law;
(2) Immediate withdrawal of military personnel to their barracks ;
(3) An official enquiry into army killings in East Pakistan;
(4) Immediate transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people (i.e. before the National Assembly met).
A fifth demand was added later that reinforcements of army units from West Pakistan must cease.
“The first four demands were in effect a demand that President Yahya Khan should accept the then status quo. According to the Awami League representatives these demands were never in terms rejected. It was clear, however, that for President Yahya Khan to implement formally the first and fourth demands would have amounted to a complete surrender. The second was already in force and the third was accepted in principle, though agreement was never reached on the form of the enquiry. The fifth demand, of course, was not accepted.” (12)
The 7th March speech as an “if speech” was like Bhasani’s Assalamu Alikum of 1957 warning to the West Pakistani rulers that if autonomy was not granted it will say goodbye. The powerful speech sent a chill down everybody’s spine to get united to fight against the Pakistani occupation forces. Although Mujib’s 7th March speech was more forcefully delivered than Bhasani’s goodby speech, but for Mujib’s negotiation again to save Pakistan, the if speech was not considered as the declaration of independence.
To avert serious deterioration of the situation, President Yahya Khan in an address to the nation on 6 March announced that the National Assembly would meet on 25 March. However, he added the warning:
‘Let me make it absolutely clear that no matter what happens, as long as I am in command of the Pakistan Armed Forces and Head of the State, I will ensure complete and absolute integrity of Pakistan. Let there be no mistake on this point. I have a duty towards millions of people of East and West Pakistan to preserve this country. They expect this from me and I shall not fail them.’ (13)
March 9th Bhasani made his goodbye speech to Pakistan at the Polton ground and asked his red brigades to work on it to achieve independence. In fact, his followers began working underground up to making the Bangladesh flag and for an armed struggle. On March 9th standing in the Paltom Ground, he reiterated “Nobody could keep the seven crore Bengali’s demand suppressed and in this struggle there is not going to be any compromise.”(14)
During this time Bhasani was concerned about the condition of the minorities. He requested that the Bengalis, the Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and Beharis to try to forget their differences and keep peace. He said, “I love the Beharis. They came to this country after much suffering.”(15) Beharis are an Urdu speaking Muslim minority who migrated from India to East Pakistan in 1947.Although Bhasani was fighting for equality and rights of the Bengalis, it seems unlike the other leaders of his time, he was not propagating an extreme nationalist sentiment and was worried about the minority’s safety.
“As from 7 March, The new governor, General Tikka Khan was unable at that time to find anyone prepared to swear him into office. …
“…the killing of 3 people by the army when barricades were formed at Joydevpur on 19 March. (At the time, Bengali police estimated that about 15 civilians were killed by the army in this incident.)” (16)
“ In mid-March some young Awami League supporters set up check-points on the approaches to Dacca airport in order to search fugitives to West Pakistan to see that they were not taking large sums of money or jewelry with them. This led to one case of violence with the victim being taken to hospital.”(17) ”
March 13,
“… There is evidence to show that attacks were made on non-Bengalis in Rangpur during the week ending March 13, and at Saidpur on March 24, during which shops and properties were burnt and a number of people killed. But considering the state of tension that prevailed, the extent of the violence was surprisingly restricted. Students and Awami League supporters were, however, preparing themselves for an eventual armed conflict. Many accounts have been given on the Pakistani side of looting of arms and ammunition and preparation of petrol and hand-made bombs manufactured from stolen chemicals. While the army remained in their cantonments, Awami League supporters subjected them to a blockade, so that fresh rations and other civilian supplies were prevented from reaching them. This action added to the fury of the army attack when it came.”(14)
“On March 15 “President Yahya Khan flew again to Dacca to hold constitutional talks with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Leaders of various West Pakistan parties arrived later in Dacca to join ill the talks. The Pakistan Government’s version of these talks is given in their White Paper.”
“According to the Pakistan White Paper, by 20 March President Yahya Khan had provisionally agreed to make a proclamation providing for an interim constitution until a new constitution had been drawn up by the National Assembly. Under the interim constitution, Yahya Khan was to continue as President and Head of State under the 1962 Constitution with a Cabinet of Ministers selected from representatives of the political parties of East and West Pakistan; the powers of the central legislature were to be as provided in the 1962 Constitution save for’ certain limitations and modifications to be agreed upon with respect to the Province of East Pakistan’; Provincial Governors were to be appointed by the President and Provisional Cabinets appointed from the members of the Provincial or National Assemblies to aid and advise the Governors; martial law was to be revoked as from the day the Provincial Cabinets took office, but if ever it appeared to the President that a situation had arisen in which the government of a province could not be carried on, the President was to be able to assume to himself the executive government of the province. All this was to be subject to the agreement of other political leaders and to the ‘all-important question of legal validity ‘.
This referred to an objection raised by President Yahya Khan’s advisers that if martial law were revoked, the instrument establishing the Central and Provisional Government would have no legal validity; ‘a constitutional vacuum would therefore be created in the country ‘. Considering the number of constitutional irregularities, which had already occurred in the short history of the state of Pakistan, this objection showed a surprising degree of constitutional sensitivity.
Mujibur Rahman’s legal expert, Dr. Kamal Hossein, was convinced that there was no validity in the objection. He suggested, and it was agreed, that the opinion should be sought of the leading Pakistan constitutional lawyer, Mr. A. K. Brohi. Mr. Brohi’s opinion supported the view of the Awami League that the objection was invalid. He advised that a precedent was to be found in the method of transferring power from the British Government at the time of Independence. According to the Awami League representatives, this opinion was accepted by President Yahya Khan and his legal adviser, ex-Chief Justice Cornelius, ‘and it disappeared from the dialogues at an early stage.'(15)
March 20. When by March 20 a fair amount of agreement seemed to have been reached on an interim constitution, the Awami League representatives urged President Yahya Khan to bring over a statutory draftsman to draw up the necessary proclamation. President Yahya Khan kept pressing the Awami League to produce their own draft. Unwisely perhaps, they eventually agreed to do so. In the circumstances, and with no agreement secured from Mr. Bhutto, the Awami League could hardly have been expected to draft a compromise proposal. Their draft (which appears to have been based on their draft constitution prepared for submission to the Constituent Assembly) expresses their negotiating position. They claim that they put it forward, not in the belief that it would be accepted in full, but expecting it to lead to more specific negotiations. Moreover, they contend that at no stage were their proposals rejected by President Yahya Khan, who kept referring matters for discussion by the expert advisers on both sides.(16)
21 March
The unexpected degree of progress, which had been made in the talks, led President Yahya Khan to call Mr. Bhutto to Dacca, where he arrived with his aides on 21 March. It was soon evident that there was no area of agreement between him and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. He insisted that martial law should be retained until the new constitution was in force, and, in order to prevent the exercise by the Awami League of what he termed their ‘brute majority’, he maintained that no law or constitution should be able to be presented in the National Assembly unless approved by a majority of the members of each wing, and any constitution approved by the National Assembly should still be subject to the Presidential veto under the Legal Framework Order.2 It may be assumed that Mr. Bhutto’s objection was to ensure that there was no lawful way in which East Bengal could obtain their economic independence, still less their political independence.(17)
23rd March was ‘Pakistan Day’, and was provocatively declared in Dacca to be ‘Resistance Day'(18)
On the same day his representatives produced to the President’s advisers a draft proclamation going well beyond the proposals which appeared to have been provisionally agreed three days earlier and, in one important respect beyond even the Six Points. The Awami League draft, which is set out in full as an appendix to the White Paper 13 provided for:
1. Martial law to stand revoked in a province from the day when the Provincial Governor (who was to be irremovable) took office, and in any event within seven days of the proclamation;
2. Members of the National Assembly from’ the State of Bangladesh , were to sit as a separate Constituent Convention to frame a constitution for the State of Bangladesh within 45 days, and members from the States of West Pakistan (Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Balukistan) were to do likewise for a constitution for the States of West Pakistan;
3. The National Assembly was then to ‘sit together as a sovereign body for the purpose of framing a constitution for the Confederation of Pakistan’ (not, as in the Six Points, a Federation), and the President was to be deprived of the power of veto which he had reserved for himself under the Legal Framework Order;
4. The provincial government and legislature of East Pakistan were to have substantially increased powers during the interim period, including foreign trade and aid, control of finance and taxation and control of their own state bank.(19)
“On the morning of March 22, 1971, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman resumed his dialogue with President Yahya Khan. At the same time, the Awami League team was busy negotiating the wording of the proposed constitution with the President’s advisers. (20)
“Others believe that President Yahya Khan would, for his part, have been ready to accept an accommodation with the Awami League but that agreement could not be achieved with Mr. Bhutto. For example, the Times correspondent, Mr. Peter Hazelhurst has written: ‘It was Bhutto who finally brought the President to take the decision which set East Bengal on fire. When the President put the Sheikh’s proposal to the West Pakistan leaders, Bhutto pointed out that if the Martial Law was withdrawn, Pakistan would be broken up into five sovereign States, the moment the President restored the power to the Provinces. He expressed the fear that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was trying to liquidate the Central Government, because when the President withdrew the Martial Law, he had no sanction to carryon as Head of the State. Half convinced, the President went back to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and expressed these fears. He promised Mujib that he would withdraw the Martial Law the moment the National Assembly met and gave the Central Government some form of validity. Sheikh Mujib reiterated his demand for the immediate withdrawal of the Martial Law.’
“According to the White Paper, the talks broke down because the Awarmi League representatives were not prepared to compromise on the essential features of their proposed proclamation”, and because their proposals were unacceptable to Mr. Bhutto or to the other party leaders from West Pakistan, or to President Yahya Khan and the army”
“It is impossible to reconcile the accounts given by the two sides. Wherever the truth lies, it can be said that the Awami League believed that the election results, coupled with the complete support they had received from the people and all organs of government in East Pakistan since 2 March, entitled them to the degree of autonomy, which they had claimed in the Six Points. When that was finally refused to them, they considered that they were entitled to claim the independence of Bangladesh in accordance with the principle of the right of self-determination.” “To President Yahya Khan and to the other army leaders, the claim to autonomy and the conduct of the Awami League appeared as treason. By 25 March the President had evidently concluded that no negotiated settlement was possible. There was no need to protract the fruitless constitutional negotiations any further. The army’s contingency plans were brought into force. It struck, and struck with terrifying brutality.” (21)
March 23rd Calm before the Storm
It was as if calm before storm, Mujib continued the talks with Yahya Khan [someone important who held all the cards]. On March 23rd Yahya Khan, Sheikh Mujib and Butto jointly gave a declaration that the assembly is postponed for an undetermined period of time. It mentioned that this was done with Mujib’s permission. Mujib did not protest this. Mansur Ahmad observed “At this I realized that Sheikh (Mujib) had not only made a wrong move he also had stepped in the trap laid by Yahya and Butto.” Referring to Mujib’s confusing moves, Mansur Ahmad says, “I did not understand Mujib then, I do not understand him now.”(22)
March 24-25
On 24 and 25 March, a group of Pakistani Generals, accompanied by General Hamid, General Mittha, the Quartermaster General, and Col. Saadullah, Principal Staff Officer, visited major garrisons via helicopter and personally briefed garrison commanders and senior West Pakistani officers on the operation. General Farman was sent to Jessore, General Khadim himself briefed the Comilla and Chittagong garrison commanders while Brig. El-Edrus and Col. Saadullah visited Rangpur.(23) “
“On March 24, 1971, the Awami League leadership stayed busy all morning working out the finer details of the economy-related issues pertaining to the Awami League’s position on a transfer of power. Meanwhile, the regime, in the guise of carrying on negotiations with Bangabandhu and his team, was essentially giving the finishing touches to the planned military action against the Bangalee population. Mujib wanted confederation,” (24)
On the night of March 24th, Yahya secretly left Dhaka for West Pakistan, ordering the army to invade Dhaka.
“Reports that the talks were foundering was common knowledge by the evening of March 24 and this resulted in outbreaks of violence in a number of centres on 25 March. The break-down in law and order which then occurred was a consequence of the breakdown in the decision to break off the negotiations and to start the army ‘crack-down’ must have been taken at the latest on March 24. However, at a further meeting on the evening of that day, President Yahya Khan’s advisers did not reject the proposals and agreed to telephone Dr. Kamal Hossein next morning with a view to arranging a further meeting on the next day to discuss its terms. This was “the telephone call which never came.” (25)
Operation Search Light (Beginninng of Genocide)
“Yahya Khan refused to sanction the arrest of Awami League leaders during a meeting with him, as the plan had proposed.The amended plan was approved and distributed to various area commanders.(26)
The Operation was to start on the night of March 25, 1971 in Dacca, and other garrisons were to be alerted via phone about their zero hour to start their activities. General Farman Ali commanded the forces in Dhaka, while the rest of the province was commanded by General Khadim. Lt. General Tikka Khan and his staff were present in the 31st field command center, to supervise and support the command staff of the 14th division.” (27)
March 25. From afternoon until midnight Mujib was approached by Awami League high command to declare independence. Finally Tajuddin came with a typed letter declaring the independence of Bangladesh, but Mujib declined. Mujib only asked them to go to safety, which they did but the ordinary citizens remained unaware of the failed talk and became the victim of genocide.
It is clear, the claim that Mujib sent a telegram to Chittagong declaring the independence couldn’t be true. Firstly when he didn’t even sign a simple handwritten paper why and how a wireless message should be sent to Chittagong in those communication wise difficult moments remains questionable? It is possible that Awami League high command led by Tajuddin that approached Mujib to declare the independence in its failure finally sent a telegram to Chittagong that was received buy Hannan who approached Zia to declare independence on March 27.
March 25 “… Rumors were in air that the Sheikh had been arrested before midnight on the 25th March that was soon confirmed from various foreign media sources. While the people were in utter confusion in the absence of the Sheikh in leadership, many of us in Dhaka knew that in the absence of the Sheikh, and in overcoming the confusion as to what the people to do, an unknown Major of the East Bengal Regiment of the Pakistan Army had declared independence of Bangladesh on the 26th March and also assumed himself the Presidency of independent Bangladesh based at Kalurghat Radio station near Chittagong, 200 away from the capital city Dhaka. The next day, on the 27th March, we knew that on insistence of some of Zia’s close colleagues, nothing of any whatsoever indication from Mujib, there was no scope of any for the two had nothing of any prior contact much less knowledge of each other, he amended the announcement in inclusion of Mujib’s name for more acceptability to the people in the declaration of independence.. “It may not be irrelevant to mention here that Mujib did not only stick to his street program for Hartal on the 27th March that he asked Tajuddin to enforce in his rhetoric SANGRAM CHALIYE JAO, but also repeatedly asked Dr Kamal until late at the 25th night (10:30 P.M.) if the much sought for lone telephone call from Yahya Khan had come or not.(28)
March 26 after midnight Mujib was found dressed up to surrender. He was taken into custody.
Mansur Ahmad narrates: “Sheikh Mujib surrendered without resistance. He did not try to escape nor hide himself.” Mansur Ahmad questioned “Is this the way the leader of a people fight against opposition?”(28)
The longwinded question why Sheikh Mujibur Rahman didn’t do the unilateral declaration of independence. It is true, Mujib was not a naïve politician as many would think. It is now clear that before the election with the other leaders of Pakistan Mujib signed the Legal Framework Document (LFD) with Yahya Khan, which restricted him to have Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). If he did the UDI, he feared that he would be charged for treason and hanged.
Daily Star reports that Mujib wanted Confederation: “The decision to break off the negotiations and to start the army ‘crack-down’ must have been taken at the latest on March 24. However, at a further meeting on the evening of that day, President Yahya Khan’s advisers did not reject the proposals and agreed to telephone Dr. Kamal Hossein next morning with a view to arranging a further meeting on the next day to discuss its terms. This was the telephone call which never came.’(29)
“Sheikh Mujib was arrested and taken to Pakistan after midnight.” “People knew only about a political action program of hartal call by the Sheikh on the 27th March”.
“The US State Department’s newly declassified documents about the 1971 debacle show that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman wanted to have a “form of confederation” with Pakistan rather than a separate country. The documents include two telegrams dating Feb 28, 1971 and Dec 23, 1971 “based on the sentiments of Sheikh Mujib and the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,” showing that Sheikh Mujib was not secessionist, as many in the then West Pakistan believed.” (30)
In not declaring the independence, it seems he saved himself and he saved his AL colleagues and most importantly his family members. While Mujib saved his near and dear ones but the uninformed citizens especially in Dhaka didn’t know when and where to escape thus became the victims of genocide.
FROM CIVIL WAR TO LIBERATION WAR
March 26 “Major Zia kept his troops at Kalurghat Bridge, but after being requested by several people found time to broadcast a declaration of independence with himself as the provisional head of state in the evening. March 27th he amended the message and declared independence on behalf of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman after consulting with Awami League leaders, and arranged to broadcast the message hourly. (31)
“The impact of this broadcast, which were picked up by the civilians and isolated Bengali units fighting the Pakistanis, was significant. Gen. Mitha planned to send another commando platoon to blow up the station, but the fate of the first platoon convinced him to send this in speedboats instead of overland.(32)
[The historic Kalurghat radio station
“…a Japanese ship anchored mid- stream in Chittagong harbour picked up Major Zia’s message. When the news of this declaration was broadcast by Radio Australia, the rest of the world came to know of it… (33)
April 3 The army went to Tangail to arrest the “Kafir” Bhasani who under the guise of a peasant avoided the invading army and left for India where he became the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of the Government in exile.(34)
After 9 months of war, on December 16, 1971 Bangladesh emerged as an independent country. Mujib returned to Bangladesh from his exile in Pakistan and became the first Prime Minister of Bangladesh and soon after his AL party made him “the father/ artechect of Bangladesh liberation war.”
It is 2011 and after 40 years of Bangladesh’s liberation war, it is still a time for reflection about the bloody events of the month of March 1971’s stormy days. As we trace the missing pieces to reconstruct history, the clock ticks away moving Bangladesh in both directions, past and future. For partisan politicians it seems everything was predetermined and settled in favor of Awami League and the appointed court judges are now giving history its final touches but for historians concerned about epistemology and its child called knowledge about Bangladesh history, surely the chapter is not yet closed.
( Abid Bahar Ph.D. is a playwright and public speaker, teaches in Canada)
Endnotes:
(1) http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm;
(2)Abid Bahar, Searching for Bhasani, Citizen of the World, Xlibris, 2010, p.195
(3) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladesh_Liberation_War
(4) Ibid
(5) http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(6) Ibid
(7) Ibid
(8) The Crisis in East Pakistan, Government of Pakistan, 5 August, 1971, p. 31.
(9) http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(10) Ibid
(11) Ibid
(12) Ibid
(13) Ibid
(14) Ibid
(15) Quoted in http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(16) http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(17) Ibid
(18) Ibid
(19) Ibid
(20) http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=178681
(21) http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(22) Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amer Dhekha Rajnitir Ponchas Bochor, (Fifty years of Politics as I Observed It), p. 555.
(23) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Searchlight
(24)Ibid
(25)’http://www.globalwebpost.com/genocide1971/docs/jurists/3_events_march.htm
(26) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Searchlight
(27) Ibid
(28) Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amer Dhekha Rajnitir Ponchas Bochor, (Fifty years of Politics as I Observed It), p. 555.
(29) Syed Badrul Ahsan Mujib Wanted Confederation, http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=178939
(30) http://archives.dawn.com/2005/07/07/nat3.htm; http://www.storyofbangladesh.com/blog/tmhussain/48-baseless-tainting-of-historical-facts.html
(31) Maj. Rafiqul Islam, A Tale of Millions, pp. 130–131
(32)Siddiq Salik, Witness To Surrender, p. 82
(33) http://www.virtualbangladesh.com/history/declaration.html
(34) Maksud, Mawlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, p. 391, pp. 392-393.
Abid Bahar, Canada
E Mail : abid.bahar@gmail.com