Geopolitical flux and India’s neighbourly policy

Sadeq Khan

Bangladesh is now set to obtain undisputed delineation of all its borders, land and marine. Myanmar settled first, by mutual accommodation with Bangladesh on land and by UNCLOS verdict on territorial waters and overlapping shelf under water. With India, the 1974 agreement on land has been pending for over forty years for Indian parliamentary approval of delineation of a small section of some 6.5 miles of disputed border, and of modalities of exchange of adversely occupied lands and enclaves on both sides since ill-done partition of British India.

The Indian parliament under Modi magic has ultimately passed unanimously a constitution amendment bill necessary on the Indian part for signing of the finalised land border protocol that was readied for signing by Indian Premier Modi’s predecessor Dr. Manmohan Singh years ago (2011). Modi is now expected to visit Bangladesh and put the seal of completion on the land border accord. Marine border delineation between Bangladesh and India had meanwhile been settled in July, 2014 by UNCLOS arbitration.

Understanding wind of change
It is certainly a milestone in the charted path of progression of our nation-state. Albeit we still have problems of habitual breach of peace in our borders by trigger-happy Indian BSF pitilessly killing cow-traders at will and Myanmarese NASAKA savagely chasing Rohingya suspects. Settled borders under international law will, nonetheless, secure territorial integrity and socio-political stability necessary for economic growth.
Sheikh Hasina and the professional team of experts in her foreign office do deserve credit for diligently pursuing the issues of land and marine border demarcation with immediate neighbours. However, the way sycophants are engaging in newspaper advertisements, showering praise and showing photo-session pictures of smiling Modi and Hasina as the driving force behind the final accord settling our borders, tends to give a wrong message and divert the viewers from realisation of the “wind of change” in the geopolitical climate that is blowing. It is important that we understand that wind of change, which is essentially the real driving force benefiting Bangladesh in the geopolitical flux and persuading the Modi era of Indian government to change course and be more accommodative to neighbourly concerns. Successive Bangladesh governments had simply all been steadfast with respect to our border claims.
The beginning of the wind of change affecting Indian outlook was observed in the inauguration of Modi government in Delhi, which was attended by heads of state or government of all SAARC countries (except Bangladesh) and of Mauritius. A more definitive diagram of that change of outlook, indicating shift from Indian compulsions as a security state to Indian prospects as a security provider state in a peaceable neighbourhood in the Indian ocean region (and beyond) and Indian ocean rim countries, came seven months later in the Obama-Modi joint vision statement. Right now Modi is engaged with President Xi Jinping of China in Beijing on bilateral and regional development issues including geostrategic concerns. Modi’s China visit this time is expected by some to be of defining nature for the future of geopolitics in the region.

Modi’s dilemma in Bangladesh
For Bangladesh, one of the first things to watch is the dilemma that Modi is facing in realising his intent of firming up India-Bangladesh relations as state to state relations, breaking away from his predecessor’s policy of close state to party (Bangladesh Awami League) relations, with which the security state of India still feels comfortable. I quote Smruti S Pattanaik in this regard from his eminent contribution in Asian Strategic Review 2015 on India as a Security Provider:
“In Bangladesh, the main opposition political party (BNP) want India to support its position on Care Taker Government; whereas the civil society, other opposition political parties and intellectuals want India to play a role in influencing Awami League government to provide political space to the opposition citing their apprehension that rightist elements would occupy the space vacated by a weakened opposition. India’s inability to meet the contradictory expectations in the neighbouring countries due to competing elite interest is perceived as a failure. For example: any truck with BNP would make AL unhappy in Bangladesh and BNP resents AL’s close relations with India; any support to Nepali Congress makes the Madhesi political parties unhappy in Nepal.”
It is not unlikely that Modi before or after his Dhaka visit will have no hesitation in resolving this dilemma by taking into account more the concerns about a truly representative government in Bangladesh as being expressed by the UN and the international community led by the United States. Another indicator is the Indian strategic community’s own rejection of the controversial 1972 Indo-Bangladesh Peace and Friendship Treaty (expiring in 1996) which Sheikh Hasina continues to defend as a well-meaning treaty.
Pattanaik observes: “To consolidate security and keep the external powers out of the region, India replicated some of the treaties of the British India Empire.”

Controversial Indo-Bangla treaty
The Treaty of Peace and Friendship which India signed with Sheikh Mujib’s Government is a case in point. This treaty was one of the most controversial treaties, extremely politicised and never operationalised; it was seen by Asian Strategic Review 2015 as an affront to the sovereignty of the newly liberated nation which lapsed unsung in 1996. Except for Nepal, where India has agreed to revise the 1950 Peace and Friendship Treaty; India has signed new treaties that takes into account the aspirations of the nation states in an emerging global order. Economic security, partnership and connectivity have found emphasis compared to the elaborate security centric features of the past treaties which were framed in the cold war period and based on the apprehensions of the post-colonial state.
“India signed Framework Agreement on Cooperation for Development Bangladesh in 2011. Article nine of this agreement provides an assurance that the territory of the two countries would not be used for activities harmful to the other. This new treaty also endorses cooperation on entire gamut of issues which include trade through road, rail, inland waterways, air and shipping, river water sharing, flood forecasting and control, natural disaster management, sharing of electricity, sub-regional cooperation in the power sector.
“To augment its role in non-traditional security sphere, India also needs to have a separate department in the foreign ministry that deals with disaster management and relief and such relief needs to be readily available whenever India’s help is sought. Failure to deliver relief material announced by New Delhi in the time of natural disaster can hamper India’s regional role, even though the failure to provide rice to the cyclone Sidr affected people in Bangladesh could have been avoided.”

India’s image problem
Pattanaik further points out loopholes in India’s neighbourhood policy over which the Modi government is having second thoughts: “India also needs to significantly improve its image on the account of the promises it makes and its implementation. This creates a huge blow to India’s credibility and needs to be corrected. For example, in the context of Bangladesh, due to bureaucratic procedures the $1 billion credit line that India has extended has not been fully utilized. Even, the grant of 200 million which was announced by the finance minister during his visit to Dhaka in May 2012 was not provided in time.
“The lack of political resolve and will to take some of the nagging bilateral issues to appropriate conclusion and the compulsion of domestic political imperatives handicaps external policy as one saw in the case of India’s Bangladesh and Sri Lanka policies. Its Nepal policy also has several stakeholders with conflicting interests that curtail the emergence of a coherent policy; India’s inability to stand by political leaders in the neighbourhood who share India’s vision of democracy and pluralism and its soft corner for political favourites some of whom do not enjoy popular support suggests a greater malaise in India’s approach. Lack of synergy between the various agencies engaged in protecting India’s security interest and the foreign policy mandarins (is another handicap). For example, inauguration of Moitree Express between Dhaka and Kolkata was delayed given the excessive emphasis on security. In the past, providing transit to Nepal and Bhutan to use Bangladesh ports got embroiled in unfounded apprehensions.

Delhi’s security vision
“In Bangladesh, semblance of stability may be marred by the growing strength of radical Islamists. Democratic consolidation and political stability would remain a problem. Since the government is elected without the participation of main opposition party it is likely that the opposition will engage in violent protest creating situation of political instability. Conclusion of war crime trials and implementing the verdicts would be an uphill task. There is a possibility of increased attack on the minorities and consolidation of fundamentalist elements; in such situation, violence that one witnessed before the election can be repeated.”
India’s security vision is evidently trying to be rid of coloured glasses of past prejudice. A popular India-friendly Bengali newspaper carried headlines after the city polls in Dhaka and Chittagong reading: Awami League wins, Democracy loses. It is to be seen whether Modi-would forget “India’s vision of democracy and pluralism” on the assurance of false sense of security against “radical Islam” by the brutal regime of repression under an unrepresentative government in its neighbourhood.

Source: Weekly Holiday