1974 famine in Bangladesh and aggravating factors

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Thomas Malthus (1766-1834) “British economist wrote an essay on the principle of population (1798), arguing that population tends to increase faster than food supply, with inevitably disastrous results unless the increase in population is checked by moral restraints or war, famine and disease”.

“More than 70 million people died in famines during the 20th century” in 16 different countries due to natural calamities, conflicts and government policies. China leads the table with six cases of famine resulting the death of 40.5-46.5 million people, followed by the Soviet Union with 18-19 million deaths in three famines as recorded by Devereux ( 2000,  page6)

Aggravating factor: Role of the USA
“The problem of import planning had been compounded by rise of international prices of grains and shortage of credit”. Bangladesh government was “desperately dollar-short” (Sen, 1981, page 136). “Under these circumstances, US food exporters cancelled two large orders which were scheduled to be delivered in September” (Miah, 1993, page 209). Lower import and lower than expected food grain internal procurement “affected the scale of relief operations not merely in terms of the number that could be covered, but also – and more importantly – in terms of amount of food that could be given to each destitute” (Sen, 1981, page 136).

Bangladesh also depended on food aid from the USA. “But the US food aid came under severe threat precisely at this point of time, since the United States decided to seek stoppage of Bangladesh’s trade with Cuba”. “The US threatened to cut off aid in September 1974. The US formally requested, “that Bangladesh cease exporting to Cuba. Under PL480, a recipient country cannot trade with blacklisted countries such as Cuba”. Bangladesh expressed “surprise and shock that the United States would actually insist that a destitute Bangladesh should restrict its exports” “Only after Bangladesh government gave in and sacrificed its trade with Cuba was the flow of American food resumed. By then the autumn famine was largely over” (Sen, 1981, page 135-136).

Islam (2003, page 229-230) provides his personal account in this regard. “Around mid-1973, we approached the US AID with a request for food aid for the fiscal year 1973-74 so as to provide a sufficient lead time. US Secretary of Agriculture, “at the time of high world prices, greatly preferred commercial sales to food aid, I tried to plead on behalf of the hungry people of Bangladesh”.

“By middle of 1974, a new round of our requests for food aid for 1974-75 was (also) awaiting the US government decision. It was for an amount of 400,000 tons. If this request was acted upon earlier …this would have created a very significant impact on the market and would have greatly dampened speculative forces”. “Moreover, the release of stocks as a result in the third quarter of 1974 could have, in all likelihood, moderated the impact of famine” (Islam, 2003, page 233).

In regard to export of jute to Cuba, “The written assurance from the Bangladesh government as above was provided in July 1974 but the agreement for food aid was not signed” (by the US government) until “the worst days of famine were over” (Islam, 2003, page 232).

Aggravating factor: Domestic conflict
As early as 1972, China-oriented, extreme left wing Maoists/Naxalites (e.g. Hoque, Toha, Shiraj Shikdar, Deben Shikdar etc.) declared their intentions to overthrow the government through armed struggle. They declared their intentions to eliminate national enemy (jateeyo shotru or class enemy) and started their secret activities. Their objective was to establish a socialist, totalitarian state, what they would call “shorboharar eknayoktontro” (Dcitatorship of the Proletariat), an example of such a state would be today’s North Korea. Such parties seemed to stress “forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions and the proletariat became the executioner who carried out the sentence” as per “The Communist Manifesto” by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1848 page 38).

The head of National Awami Party (Bhasahni) declared in January 1973 “I shall turn Bangladesh into Vietnam” (readers may remember bloody and prolonged war in that country in 60’s and 70’s). The defeated forces of 1971 war of liberation, who were already allegedly involved in subversive activities, first gleefully watched from the sideline and later joined hands with these forces.

Jatyo Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) was formed in October 1972 with the aim of establishing Scientific Socialism (Boigganeek Shomajtontro). They established Biplobi Sainik Sangstha (Revuliorary Soldier’s Organisation) and the Biplobi Gono Bahini (People’s Revultionary Army) in July 1974. If JSD or Maoists had succeeded, “Bangladesh would be pushed irrecoverably into radical, revolutionary channel” (Mascarenhas, 1986, page 112).

Activities of Maoists groups included not only eliminating bourgeois class enemies (i.e. members of AL, petty capitalists/business people, local traders, black marketeers, hoarders) but also attacking and looting police stations, food silos, setting fire to jute mills, jute godowns, even trucks or mechanized boats/launches carrying food grains on daily basis in different parts of Bangladesh. Miah (1993, page 177) reported 60 such attacks on police stations and an estimated death of 4,925 people by May 1973. This pattern continued through 1974-75.

Regarding the common propaganda (conducted at a later period) and politics of convenience of political left and political right, Mascarenhas (1986, page 107) says, “They were the work of extreme right wing groups such as Muslim League, and the left wing JSD. The leaflets from the political right and left had a common theme”.

The government responded by forming a special Security Force (Rokhee Bahinia) to deal with such activities. The opposition claimed up to 30-40 thousand deaths on their sides due to government’s brutal or heavy-handed response. The newly independent Bangladesh was in a middle of a civil war in 1974 when the severe flood struck. Scarce resources, which could have been allocated to alleviate sufferings of the destitute people, were wasted on fighting the Maoists/Naxalites.

Conclusion
Ultimate responsibility of running a country rests with the government; therefore, the 1974 famine was a failure of the Mujib government. As Islam (2003, page 221) has so eloquently said “Naturally, the government of the day bore the greatest responsibility…It is considered a mark of a government’s failure that in its watch people died for want of food”. However, “As one looks back at this phenomenon, it appears that during the period of famine itself, not all the factors that contributed to it were recognized in terms of their true significance and in proper perspective”.

There was an “Act of God” i.e. the unprecedented flood, there were acts of demi-gods i.e. international community led by the US, who failed to respond (adequately), there were acts of evils i.e. the hoarders and subversive Naxalites and last but not least the acts of “mere mortals” i.e. the Mujib  government.

As a nation there was a sense of urgency but there was no guiding coalition to take the people through the calamities caused by “adverse synergies between natural trigger (flood), political culpability” (administration, conflict, failures of international response) and consequent market failure.

Source: Bd news24